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THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER AND THE
INCOME TAX
By ROBERT HANES GRAY*
T HAS BEEN SAID that income subject to the federal income tax
should be computed in the same general manner as income for
ordinary accounting purposes.' Any substantial variation between
net income and taxable net income requires laborious and expen-
sive audits, adjustments, memoranda and reconciliations on the
part of the taxpayer and causes an undue increase in the costs of
administration and collection on the part of the government.2
At best, taxation is not a subject which is considered with en-
thusiasm by the taxpayer. The collection of a just tax is prone to
cause momentary unhappiness to even the most public-spirited
citizen. But when a tax is unfair, or is harshly administered, his
reaction is frequently painful to his associates and eventually
detrimental to the existing form of government.3 A tax which
purports to be a tax on income but which obviously taxes a great
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
'For example, see Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal
Aspects, in Haig, The Federal Income Tax (1921) 16; Montgomery, In-
come Tax Procrdure (1923) 400; Report of the Committee on Federal
Taxation, American Institute of Accountants, (1937) 64 Journal of Ac-
countancy 349; Preliminary Report of the Committee Appointed by the
National Tax Association to Prepare a Plan of a Model System of State and
Local Taxation (1918) 15. For a reference to this argument, see the testi-
mony of Roswell Magill representing the United States Treasury Depart-
ment, Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue
Revision 1938, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 143.
2 Gilman, Accounting Concepts of Profit (1939) 16.
3"At all times liberty has been inseparably linked with taxation in
whatever form it may be applied." Peck and Thorpe, Neither Purse Nor
Sword (1936) 168. "For nearly a thousand years the Anglo-Saxon race
has been fighting its way to freedom, and the struggle has largely taken
the form of resisting unjust taxation. On that issue Magna Charta was
wrested from King John, and on that issue these United States came into
being." Abbott, Justice and the Modern Law (1913) 212.
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deal more inevitably causes dissatisfaction 4 and leads to evasion,
perjury and corruption., Every consideration of policy indicates
that the income tax statute should incorporate as nearly as pos-
sible an orthodox conception of "income."
The drafting of such a statute is difficult enough under the
most favorable conditions. Economists, accountants and judges
have disagreed for years on the meaning of income.0 Yet in
spite of the confusion which still exists, various accounting, eco-
nomic and legal organizations continue to investigate the prob-
lem. And as the result of their activities and of the work of
independent specialists certain generally accepted principles are
beginning to emerge. 7 Although the outlines of the income con-
cept are vague and wavering they are becoming constantly clearer.
The income tax under the sixteenth amendment has reflected
to a gratifying extent the development in the understanding of
the meaning of income.8 After the 1913 Act" accountants and
4Peloubet, Depreciation Under the Revenue Act of 1934, (1934) 58
Journal of Accountancy 169, 197, 198. See also Beale, The Measure of
Income for Taxation, (1911) 19 J. of Pol. Econ. 655, 656.5Judge Cooley thought that this would be the result under any income
tax. "An income tax is objectionable, because it is inquisitorial, and because
it teaches the people evasion and fraud. No means at the command of tho
government has ever enabled it to arrive with anything like accuracy at the
incomes of its citizens, and they resist its inquisitions with all practical
modes." Cooley, Taxation (1876) 20. Andrew Carnegie, while favoring
an inheritance tax, held similar views concerning the income tax. Editorial,
The Independent, December 20, 1906, p. 1502. See also Post, The Income
Tax, The Outlook, March 2, 1907, p. 503, 505 et seq. "Mr. Gladstone's
dictum that an income tax made a nation of liars, and that nothing does
more to demoralize and corrupt the people, could certainly not be chal-
lenged by an appeal to American experience." Editorial, (1913) 58 Living
Age 698, 699.
6For example, see Hewett, The Definition of Income and Its Applica-
tion in Federal Taxation (1925) 8, 9; Rottschaefer, The Concept of Income
in Federal Taxation, (1929) 13 MixNESOTA LAW REvIEW 637, 638; Wueller,
Concepts of Taxable Income I, (1938) 53 Pol. Sci. Q. 83, 84. Cf. Haig,
The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in Haig, The Fed-
eral Income Tax (1921) 11. For the judicial confusion and uncertainty,
see Magill, Taxable Income (1936) ch. 12; Spahr, The Supreme Court on
the Incidence and Effects of Taxation (1925) ch. 1; Buehler, Public Finance
(1936) 417. For statements concerning the uncertainty in accounting see
Greer, What Are Accepted Principles of Accounting? (1938) 13 Account-
ing Review 25; Brink, The Need for Single-Purpose Statements, (1940) 69
Journal of Accountancy 284; Ballantine, Taxable Income, (1925) 40 Journal
of Accountancy 349, 350. See also, Thomas, Federal Income Taxation,
(1939) 67 Journal of Accountancy 15, 16, 17. Clark, Eisner v. Macomber
and Some Income Tax Problems, (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 735, 737.7For recent statements of basic theory see Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore,
A Statement of Accounting Principles (1938); Paton and Littleton, An
Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards (1940).8See the address of Charles D. Hamel, former Chairman of the Board
of Tax Appeals, (1924) 3 The Certified Public Accountant 273; Kirkham,
Depreciation Under the Income Tax, (1936) 11 Accounting Review 345,
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economists played an increasingly- important part in tl.e evolution
of an acceptable tax statute."0 Many o.f the objectionable features
of the original act were removed, greater reliance was placed upon
sound accounting principles- and the nation seemed to be well on
the way to achieving a highly, equitable method of raising the
public revenue.
Unfortunately, in recent years there have been powerful forces
running counter to the trend which had been developing for
almost two decades. The depression and its consequent dininu-
tion of revenue, the rearmament program and its demand for addi-
tional funds have placed legislative committees under tremendous
pressure. In investigating all possible sources of revenue it was
inevitable that the deduction provisions of the income tax should
be questioned."' A denial of a deduction would be the equivalent
of a discovery of a new source of revenue, and collections could
be greatly increased without a corresponding increase in rates.' 2
372; Moyer, The Income Tax-Accounting Aspects, (1928) 3 Accounting
Review 18, 20; Committee on Federal Taxation, Federal Tax Revision
Program, (1939) 68 Journal of Accountancy 305; Harrow, The Supreme
Court on Accounting Matters, (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 607, 608.
038 Stat. at L. 166. Congressman Cordell Hull requested a committee
of accountants to "frame an income-tax law which would inlicate its ideas
and which lie could use as a framework around which to build the act
which would be finally enacted. This the committee did, and a few scattered
fragments of its language are to be found in the respectable parts of the
act of 1913 and each of the succeeding revenue acts, but in the main Congress
itself constructed and should be responsible for the 1913 law, with its
crudities and absurdities.' Gore. From Wickersham to Mellon, (1926) 42
Journal of Accountancy, 269, 272. See also, Moyer, The Income Tax-
Accounting Aspects, (1928) 3 Accounting Review 18, 20.
I(,Gore, Report of the President, American Institute of Accountants,
(1924) 38 Journal of Accountancy 321, 322; Hamel, The Board of Tax
Appeals, (1924) 38 Journal of Accountancy 327.
"The sub-committee report on the Revenue Act of 1934 recommended
that deductions for depiction and depreciation be reduced by twenty-five
percent for the years 1934, 1935, 1936. While recognizing the soundness of
such allowances from an accounting standpoint it was pointed out that they
did not represent cash outgo like wages, repairs and similar expense and
furthernore the amount of the allowance was a very uncertain factor since
it depended upon the estimated life of the property. Preliminary Report
of a Sub-Conmittee on Ways and Means on Prevention of Tax Avoidance,
73rd Cong.. 2d Sess. (1933) 4, 5. (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 274.
21i 1932 individual returns showed income totaling $13.764,294.43,
and in 1933 the total income amounted to $13.117,545,254, while during tile
same years deductions amounted to $2.578,795.334 and $2.271.891.722 re-
spectively. Statistics of Income for 1932 (1934) 7; Statistics for Income
for 1933 (1934) 7. Corporate statistics are much more startling. For
example, corporate tax returns in 1936 showed deductions for depreciation
amonunting to $l.456-292.000. officers' salaries $1,323,073,000. interest expense
$798,845,000 and rent paid $592,622,000. Since the reported net income for
income tax computation amounted to only $5,428,109,000 a denial of these
deductions alone would almost double the revenues collected from corpora-
tions. Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
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If Congress should enact,,legislation limiting or denying the
right to make the usual deductions from gross income,"8 does the
constitution offer the taxpayer any protection? The question is
an important one during ordinary times; it becomes immeasur-
ably more important during a period when income tax rates are
greatly increased.
I.
Conventional discussions of the sixteenth amendment" re-
volve around the problem of distinguishing capital from income.
It is pointed out that regardless of whether income is defined as
the "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
bined,"15 or as the "money value of the net accretion to one's
economic power between two points of time."10 or as "the surplus
remaining . . . after providing for all costs, expenses and
allowances for accrued or probable losses,"1 7 the definitions of
the judge, the economist and the accountant are in agreement on
one point at least: income represents gain.
If the sixteenth amendment permits only the taxation of in-
come it would necessarily follow that a tax under the amend-
ment which included something more than the net profit of a
transaction would be in effect a tax on the return of capital
and invalid. The emphasis of the Supreme Court on the word
"gain" has led many to suggest that the income concept of the
(1938) 688, 689. It was estimated that the twenty-five per cent reduction
of the allowance for depletion and depreciation would result in an increase
in revenue of about $85,000,000 annually. Preliminary Report of a Sub-
Committee on Ways and Means on Prevention of Tax Avoidance, 73rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1933) 4, 5.
.3"No one really likes to pay taxes, but it is much pleasanter to pay a
tax if it is imposed in a clear, definite way and applies equally to all tax-
payers who live or work under substantially the same conditions. It is,
however, intolerable to be told that your tax rates have not increased, or
have only increased a small percentage, and to be told in the same breath
that you will pay more tax because deductions are going to be denied or
reduced. There is neither scientific basis nor common sense in this method
of taxation. The only fair thing to do is to define income and expenses
in a simple, understandable, accurate manner and raise more revenue b
increasing rates." Peloubet, Depreciation Under the Revenue Act of 193,
(1934) 58 Journal of Accountancy 169, 197.14United States constitution, amendment XVI: "The Congress sllal
have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without
regard to any census or enumeration."
-
5Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, (1913) 231 U. S. 399, 34
Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L. Ed. 285; Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189,
40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521.
l8 Haig, The Concept of Income-Legal and Economic Aspects, in Haig,
The Federal Income Tax (1921) 27.17Montgomery, Auditing-Theory and Practice (4th ed. 1927) 360.
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sixteenth amendment is a net income concept rather than a gross
income or even an intermediate concept.' 8
To deny a taxpayer the right to deduct from his gross re-
ceipts the full amount of the expense incurred in securing the
receipts results in the taxation of capital.19 Therefore, if a tax
on income was substantially the same as a direct tax,20 a fortiori
a tax on a mere conversion of capital was a direct tax and both
were invalid unless apportioned. The sixteenth amendment has
relieved Congress of the necessity of apportionment in the former
case but not in the latter.21
So runs the argument which would deny Congress the power
to tax as income anything which was not income; and a substan-
tial number of cases apparently sustain this contention. In Good-
rich v. Edwards22 the Court held that there was no taxable gain
where the stockholder sold shares held as an investment for an
amount which was more than the March 1, 1913 value but which
was less than original cost. Since the statute expressly provided
for the inclusion in gross income of the difference between the
1913 value and the selling price,2 3 the case would appear to be
authority for the contention that Congress may tax only net
income.2 4 An earlier case, Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.," involved
'
8For example, see Tuller, The Taxing Power (1937) 377, 378;
Powell, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Income Taxation, in Haig,
Federal Income Tax (1921) 51; Clark, Can Congress Tax "Gross Income"
under the Sixteenth Amendment? (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 513; Rottschaefer,
The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation, (1929) 13 MiNNEsOTA LAw
R-vmw 637; Kollenberg, Taxable Income Under the Sixteenth Amendment,
(1931) 9 Tax Mag. 87. Montgomery, Accounting and the Concept of
Income, in Magill, Lectures on Taxation (1932) 56.
19 See Dohr, Income Divorced from Reality, (1938) 66 Journal of
Accountancy 361; Montgomery, Accounting and the Concept of Income, in
Magill, Lectures on Taxation (1932) 39.
20PollotC v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup.
Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759.
23Eisner v. Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed.
521; Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 170, 174, 46 Sup.
Ct. 449, 451, 70 L. Ed. 886; Taft v. Bowers, (1929) 278 U. S. 470, 481, 49
Sup. Ct. 199, 201, 73 L. Ed. 460.
22(1921) 255 U. S. 527, 41 Sup. Ct. 390, 65 L. Ed. 758.
2 3
"For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale or
other disposition of property . . . the fair market price or value of such
property as of March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, shall be the basis
for determining the amount of such gain derived." (1916) 39 Stat. at L. 757;
(1917) 40 Stat. at L. 300, 307. Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 316.
"4However, the government confessed error in making the assessment
so the question was not fully argued. (1921) 255 U. S. 527, 534, 41 Sup.
Ct. 390, 65 L. Ed. 758. But in United States v. Flannery, (1925) 268 U. S.
98, 103, 104, 45 Sup. Ct. 420, 69 L. Ed. 865 the Court said that "the decision
shows that it vas not based on the confession of error or any cousliutional
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the deduction section of the Corporation Excise Tax Act of
1909. " The lumber company claimed a deduction for the De-
cember 31, 1908 value of the stumpage cut during the taxable
year. In sustaining the contention of the corporation, the Court
said that
"it is plain, we think, that by the intent and meaning of the
act the entire proceeds of a mere conversion of capital assets were
not to be treated as income. . . . In order to determine whether
there has been gain or loss, and the amount of gain, if any, we
must withdraw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to
restore the capital value that existed at the commencement of the
period under consideration. '2T
While it is true that the decision involved the interpretation
of "income" as used in the 1909 Act,28 the Supreme Court has
frequently remarked that the meaning of income as used in the
amendment must be taken in its commonly understood sense"
and the case at least indicates its meaning as then understood by
the Court. Furthermore, at least one case has suggested that the
meaning of income in the amendment is the same as its meaning
in the 1909 Act.8 0 But whatever may be its true significance, the
question ...but ... as a matter of construction . . ." the statute imposed
a tax upon gains only. (Italics supplied.)
25(1918) 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L. Ed. 1054.
26(1909) 36 Stat. at L. 11, 112.
27(1918) 247 U. S. 179, 184, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L. Ed. 1054. It
should be noted, however, that the Court was speaking of "the intent and
meaning of the act." See infra, note 244. Subsequent cases failed to note
this distinction and the decision has been cited in connection with the
constitutional power of Congress. "No confusion of thought can be more
disastrous from the legal standpoint than a confusion between the consti-
tutional approach and the interpretative approach to a question." Paul,
Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (1938) 149.
2 81t has been frequently stated that the meaning of income in the acts
following the sixteenth amendment is the same as its meaning in the 1909
Act. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, (1918) 247 U. S. 330, 335, 38
Sup. Ct. 540, 542, 68 L. Ed. 1142; Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, (1921) 255 U. S. 509, 519, 41 Sup. Ct. 386, 389, 65 L. Ed. 751 ;
Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, (1925) 268 U. S. 628, 631. 45 Sup. Ct. 614, 615,
69 L. Ed. 1124; Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 170,
174, 46 Sup. Ct. 449, 451, 70 L. Ed. 886; Burnet v. Harmel, (1932) 287
U. S. 103, 108, 53 Sup. Ct. 74, 76, 77 L. Ed. 199.
2 9For example, see Lynch v. Hornby, (1918) 247 U. S. 339, 344, 38
Sup. Ct. 543, 545, 63 L. Ed. 1149; Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, (1921) 255 U. S. 509, 519, 41 Sup. Ct. 386, 389. 65 L. Ed. 751;
United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., (1936) 297 U. S. 88,
99, 56 Sup. Ct. 353, 358. 80 L. Ed. 500. See also, Holmes, J., dissenting in
Eisner v. Macomber, (1919) 252 U. S. 189, 219, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 197, 64
L. Ed. 521.
SOBowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 170, 174, 46
Sup. Ct. 449, 451, 70 L. Ed. 886.
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Mitchell Bros. Case has been cited with approval by a number of
decisions arising under the sixteenth amendment income tax
acts.31 As was said in Eisner v. Macomber,32
"It becomes essential to distinguish between what is and
what is- not 'income.' . . .Congress cannot by any definition it
may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter
the constitution."
And the Court in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad3 said that
"The sixteenth amendment, like other laws authorizing or im-
posing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to be extended
beyond the meaning dearly indicated by the language used."'31
Subsidy payments made to the railroad by the Republic of Cuba
"were not profits- or gains from the use or operation of the rail-
road, and do not constitute income within the meaning of the
sixteenth amendment.
31 5
Thus it would seem dear that strong arguments could be ad-
vanced to support the contention that the amendment does not
authorize Congress to tax the full receipts from an enterprise or
transaction, but that the taxpayer must be permitted to deduct
the capital expended in securing the receipts before an income
tax can be laid and collected; and if Congress may tax only that
part of a transaction which represents income it goes without
saying that Congress may not tax as income an event which con-
tains no element of profit.
Yet any statement which assumes an implied limitation upon
311n Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, (1918) 247 U. S. 330, 335, 38 Sup.
Ct. 540, 542, 68 L. Ed. 1142, the Court said: "We must reject in this case, as
we have rejected in cases arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of
1909 the broad contention ... that all receipts-that everything that comes
in-are income within the proper definition of the term 'gross income,' and
that the entire proceeds of a conversion of capital assets, in whatever form
and under -whatever circumstances accomplished, should be treated as gross
income." In Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co., (1931) 283 U. S. 301,
307, 51 Sup. Ct. 418, 420, 75 L. Ed. 1049, the Court cited the Mitchell Bros.
Case for the following proposition: "To ascertain gain on a sale of a
capital asset, there must be subtracted from the sale price a sum sufficient
to restore the value at the date of acquisition (or March 1, 1913)." And in
Burnet v. Logan, (1931) 283 U. S. 404, 51 Sup. Ct. 550, 75 L. Ed. 1143,
where the taxpayer sold shares of stock for cash and a portion of the ores
to be recovered from certain mines, the Court held that no profit was
realized until the payment on account of the extracted ore fully restored the
taxpayer's capital. The authority for the decision was the statement from
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. that "In order to determine whether there has
been a gain or loss ... we must withdraw from the proceeds an amount
sufficient to restore the capital value."32(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 206, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193, 64 L. Ed. 521.
33(1925) 268 U. S. 628, 45 Sup. Ct. 614, 69 L. Ed. 1124.
$4268 U. S. 628, 631, 45 Sup. Ct. 614, 615, 69 L. Ed. 1124.
35268 U. S. 628, 633, 45 Sup. Ct. 614, 615, 69 L. Ed. 1124.
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the power of Congress to tax should be critically examined. The
framers of the constitution intended to give Congress ample power
to raise revenue; there was no intention to repeat the mistakes of
the articles of confederation.3
The constitution expressly denies Congress the power to tax
articles exported from any state; 3T except for this one prohibition
its power to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and ex-
cises" 3s is said to embrace "every conceivable power of taxa-
tion. ' ' 39 Although virtually unlimited in choice of subject, Con-
gress is expressly restricted as to the methods which may be used
in the exercise of its power to tax. All duties, imposts and excises
must be uniform throughout the United States,'40 while capitation




This "plenary" power has met with surprisingly few judicial
restraints. 42 While the fifth amendment, 3 after some hesita-
Bc30. Boutwell, The Income Tax, (1895) 160 North American Review
589, 590 et seq.3VUnited States constitution, art I, see. 9. "No tax or duty shall be
laid on articles exported from any state."
3sUnited States constitution, art. I, sec. 8. "The Congress shall have
the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises."
39Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 12, 36 Sup.
Ct. 236, 239, 60 L. Ed. 493. For a more recent case see Chas. C. Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 548, 581, 57 Sup, Ct. 883, 888,
81 L. Ed. 1279: "The subject-matter of taxation open to the power of
the Congress is as comprehensive as that open to the power of the states
: .* If the tax is a direct one, it shall be apportioned. . . .If it is a duty,
impost, or excise, it shall be uniform. . . .Together, these classes include
every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty."
40United States constitution, art. I, sec. 8. "All duties, imposts, and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
4lUnited States constitution, art. I, sec. 9. "No capitation or other direct
tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein
before directed to be taken."
United States constitution, art. I, sec. 2. "Representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included
within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those
bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three-fifths of all other persons."
42See Gilbert, Provisions of Federal Law Held Unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court of the United States (1936). The cases may be classi-
fied as follows: Intergovernmental immunity, Collector v. Day, (1871) 11
Wall. (U.S.) 113, 20 L. Ed. 122; United States v. Railroad Co., (1873) 17
Wall. (U.S.) 322, 21 L. Ed. 597; National Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
(1928) 277 U. S. 508, 48 Sup. Ct. 591, 72 L. Ed. 968; Indian Motorcycle
Co. v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 570. 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 75 L. Ed.
1277; Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., (1932) 285 U. S. 393, 52 Sup. Ct.
443, 76 L. Ed. 815. Diminution of salaries of federal judges, Evans v. Gore,
(1920) 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887; Miles v. Graham,
(1925) 268 U. S. 501, 45 Sup. Ct. 601, 69 L. Ed. 1067. Unapportioned
"income tax," Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 157 U. S.
THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER
tion," has been invoked to limit the taxing power of Congress,'5
the actual cases striking down its revenue provisions have been
few."0 The problem of classification for tax purposes has caused
429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759; Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S.
189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521. Tax on exports, Fairbank v. United
States, (1901) 181 U. S. 283, 21 Sup. Ct. 648, 45 L. Ed. 862; United
States v. Hvoslef, (1915) 237 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 459, 50 L. Ed. 813;
Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, (1915) 237 U. S. 19,
35 Sup. Ct. 496, 59 L. Ed. 821; Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, (1923) 262
U. S. 66, 43 Sup. Ct. 485, 67 L. Ed. 865. Improper use of taxing power
for regulatory purposes, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., (1922) 259 U. S.
20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817; Hill v. Wallace, (1922) 259 U. S.
44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 822; Trusler v. Crooks, (1926) 269 U. S.
475, 46 Sup. Ct. 165, 70 L. Ed. 365; United States v. Constantine, (1935)
296 U. S. 287, 56 Sup. Ct 223, 80 L. Ed. 233; United States v. Butler,
(1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477; Rickert Rice Mills v.
Fontenot, (1936) 297 U. S. 110, 56 Sup. Ct. 374, 80 L. Ed. 513; Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160.
Retroactive excise taxes, Nichols v Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47
Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L. Ed. 1184; Untermyer v. Anderson, (1928) 276 U. S.
440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353, 72 L. Ed. 645; Heiner v. Donman, (1932) 285 U. S.
312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772.
43United States constitution, amend. V: "No person . . . shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
44Chief Justice White in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., (1916)
240 'U. S. 1, 24, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 244, 60 L. Ed. 493, said that ". . . the
due process clause of the fifth amendment ... is not a limitation upon the
taxing power conferred upon Congress by the constitution. . . " The
chief justice made a similar statement in Billings v. United States, (1914)
232 U. S. 261, 282, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 424, 58 L. Ed. 596.4 5 McCray v. United States, (1904) 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49
L. Ed. 78; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct.
342, 55 L. Ed. 389; Billings v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 34
Sup. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 596; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., (1918)
240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493; La Belle Iron Works v.
United States, (1921) 256 U. S. 377, 41 Sup. Ct. 528, 65 L. Ed. 998;
Haavik v. Alaska Packers Association, (1924) 263 U. S. 510. 44 Sup. Ct.
177, 68 L. Ed. 414; Bromley v. McCaughn, (1929) 280 U. S. 124, 50
Sup. Ct 46, 74 L. Ed. 226; Cooper v. United States, (1930) 280 U. S.
409, 50 Sup. Ct. 164, 74 L. Ed. 516; Reinecke v. Smith, (1933) 289 U. S.
172, 53 Sup. Ct. 570, 77 L. Ed. 1109; United States v. Hudson, (1937) 299
U. S. 498, 57 Sup. Ct. 309, 81 L. Ed. 370; Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, (1937) 301 U. S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 764, 81 L. Ed. 112-; Tyler v.
United States, (1930) 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356, 74 L. Ed. 991;
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883,
81 L. Ed. 1279; United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, (1939) 307 U. S.
57, 59 Sup. Ct. 692, 83 L. Ed. 1104; United States v. Jacobs, (1939) 306
U. S. 363, 59 Sup. Ct. 551, 83 L. Ed. 763.
"Except in rare and special instances, the due process of law clause
contained in the fifth amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power
conferred upon Congress by the constitution.' A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
(1934) 292 U. S. 40, 44, 54 Sup. Ct. 599, 601, 78 L. Ed. 1077.
46Nichols v. Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L. Ed.
1184 (retroactive application of the estate tax); Untermyer v. Anderson,
(1928) 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353, 78 L. Ed. 645 and Blodgett v.
Holden, (1928) 275 U. S. 142, 276 U. S. 594, 48 Sup. Ct. 105, 72 L. Ed.
206 (retroactive application of the gift tax) ; Heiner v. Donnan, (1932) 285
U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772 (estate tax on all gifts within two
years of decedent's death).
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little difficulty4 7 and that of retroactive taxation only occasional
and temporary inconvenience4 8-- and then over the objection of
a powerful minority.49 The doctrine that the power to tax may be
used only for a public purpose has not been applied to federal as
it has to state taxation.50 Whatever may be the limitations upon
the rapidly expanding spending power of Congress,51 it is fairly
clear that a carefully drawn statute will avoid any serious con-
stitutional difficulty on this score. 52 Anticipatory legislation easily
removes any doubt as to the power of Congress to tax federal
officials, 53 while the power to tax state officials and employees is
47In Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 215, it is stated that "the
Supreme Court has thus far never found a classification made by Congress
in levying taxes to be so arbitrary as to violate due process, but has sus-
tained numerous classifications as valid." But see Heiner v. Donnan, (1932)
285 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772 where an estate tax on all
gifts made within two years of decedent's death was held invalid.48See note 44 supra.
4 9See the dissent of Brandeis, J., with whom Holmes and Stone, JJ.,
concurred, in Untermyer v. Anderson, (1928) 276 U. S. 440, 447, 48 Sup.
Ct. 353, 355, 72 L. Ed. 645. "For more than half a century, it has been
settled that the law of Congress imposing a tax may be retroactive in its
operation."
5OSee Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 171.5 11n United States v. Butler, (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312,
80 L. Ed. 477, the Court held that the spending power could not be used
to regulate individual conduct in a field of authority exclusively reserved to
the states.52 1n the Butler Case there was no question about the power of Con-
gress to lay an excise tax on processors. See dissent of Stone, J. in 297
U. S. at 79. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, (1937) 301 U. S. 308,
57 Sup. Ct. 764, 74 L. Ed. 991. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, (1923) 262
U. S. 447, 487, 488, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078, the Court said that
the interest of a taxpayer in the "moneys in the treasury . . . is shared
with millions of others, is comparatively minute and indeterminable, and
the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote,
fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the pre-
ventive powers of a court of equity." And that "The party who invokes the
power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct in-
jury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally." Because of this insufficient
interest of a taxpayer in the payment of money by the government, it has
been suggested that a tax on processors in a revenue act and a separate
statute appropriating money to farmers on condition that they reduce acre-
age might meet the constitutional objection of the Butler Case. (1936) 49
Harv. L. Rev. 828, 829.
53In Evans v. Gore, (1920) 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed.
887 and in Miles v. Graham, (1925) 268 U. S. 501, 45 Sup. Ct. 601, 69 L.
Ed. 1067, the Supreme Court held that an inclusion of a federal judge's
salary in his gross income violated art. III, sec. 1 of the United States
constitution since it amounted to a diminution of salary during continuance
in office. In 1932 Congress again provided for the inclusion of such salaries
in the taxpayer's gross income but expressly limited the tax to those
judges who took office after the effective date of the act. (1932) 47
Stat. at L. 169. In O'Malley v. Woodrough, (1939) 307 U. S. 277, 59 Sup.
Ct. 838, 83 L. Ed. 1289, the act was sustained and the two earlier cases
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no longer questioned.5 4 These decisions have also cast serious
doubt upon the inununity of state and local bonds from federal
taxation 55
In view of the broad power of Congress to lay and collect
taxes and of the relatively few implied limitations read into the
constitution by the Supreme Court, it would appear that the ob-
servation made some twenty years ago that "the constitutional
aspects of federal income taxation are relatively unimportant"' 8
applies with even greater force today. As long as capitation and
direct taxes are apportioned and all other taxes are uniform, the
taxpayer must seek relief through legislative rather than through
judicial channels. The constitution affords him little protection.
Yet the very fact that there is a requirement that indirect
taxes must be uniform and that direct taxes must be apportioned
offers an opportunity to assert a claim of unconstitutionality. Since
the uniformity clause has been interpreted to mean territorial uni-
formity,57 there has been no successful attack on this basis. How-
ever, the same has not been true of the requirement that direct
taxes be apportioned; here opponents of federal tax legislation
have met with at least temporary success.
II.
Within a few years after the ratification of the constitution,
Congress was forced to supplement its revenue"8 by means of in-
overruled to the extent that they were inconsistent with the latter opinion.
Section 3 of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 removed the limitation of
the 1932 Act and all judges, regardless of time of appointment, are sub-ject to the federal income tax. The salary of the president of the United
States is likewise subject to the tax. (1932) 47 Stat. at L. 169 and sub-
sequent enactments. See Blakey, The Federal Income Tax (1940) 460-462.54In Collector v. Day, (1870) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 113. 20 L. Ed. 122, the
Court held that the salary of a state judge was not subject to a federal in-
come tax. This case was expressly overruled by Graves v. O'Keefe, (1939)
306 U. S. 466, 486, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 601, 83 L. Ed. 927. Although the
case involved a state tax on a federal employee, the Court said that the case
was overruled so far as it recognized "an implied constitutional immunity
from income taxation of the salaries of officers and employees of the . . .
state government or their instrumentalities.' See Helvering v. Gerhardt,(1938) 304 U. S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427; (1939) 1 WaslL &
Lee L. Rev. 67.
551. R. C. (1939) sec. 22(b) (4) expressly excludes such interest from
the federal tax. See the writer's discussion in Derivative Tax Immunity and
the Income from State Bonds, (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 1357.5rPowell, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Income Taxation, in Haig,
The Federal Income Tax, (1921) 51.57 Knowlton v. Moore (1900) 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L.
Ed. 969; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup.
Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493; Chas. C. Steward Machine Co. v: Davis, (1937)
301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed. 1279.58Existing tonnage and customs duties were estimated to yield $1,467,-
086 while the annual expenses of the civil establishment of the new govern-
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ternal taxes since the duties on imports"9 proved to be inadequate.
In 1791 Congress laid a duty on each gallon of spirits distilled in
the United States and an annual duty on "country" stills measured
by production capacity. 60 Whatever issues may have been raised
by the tax,6 1 that of unconstitutionality for want of apportion-
ment does not appear to have been one of them. The power to
tax manufactured products or the means required for their pro-
duction was taken as a matter of course, particularly in view of
the fact that the article in question was considered by some to
be in the class of luxuries. 2
Three years later Congress again sought to secure additional
revenue. A tax was laid upon "all carriages for the conveyance
of persons .. .for his or her own use, or to be let to hire, or
for the conveyance of passengers."63 In addition to the carriage
tax Congress also imposed a tax on dealers in wines and liquors,0'
a tax on all sugar refined in the United States and a tax on all
snuff manufactured for sale within the United States,00 and a tax
on auction sales.06
Although these taxes were only temporary measures, 7 the fact
that within less than four years after the constitution went into
effect a tax on property8 was sponsored and enacted by men who
had participated in the constitutional convention would appear to
be significant. 69 Taxes on spirits had been known in England and
in the colonies and had not been considered as direct taxesT--and
ment amounted to $630,101 and accrued interest and overdue bonds
amounted to $15,000,000. 1 State Papers, Finance 12.
59(1789) 1 Stat. at L. 24.
60(1791) 1 Stat. at L. 199.
61E.g., the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Comstock, Excises in Modern
Times, (1936) 183 Annals, Am. Academy Pol. and Soc. Sci. 111.
62Howe, Taxation in the United States under the Internal Revenue
System (1896) 17.
63(1794) 1 Stat. at L. 373.
64(1794) 1 Stat. at L. 376.
65(1794) 1 Stat. at L. 384.
60(1794) 1 Stat. at L. 397. The tax was limited to the sale of land and
certain specified types of other property. Its amount was determined by
the "purchase money arising by the sale."
67These taxes were repealed in 1802. 2 Stat. at L. 148.
O8Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 9 Harv. L.
Rev. 198, 210. See also Seligman, The Income Tax Amendment, (1910)
25 Pol. Sc. Q. 193, 196.
69See Hampton & Co. v. United States, (1928) 276 U. S. 394, 411, 412,
48 Sup. Ct. 348,,353, 72 L. Ed. 624.
7SFor many illustrations, see Opinion of the Justices, (1908) 196 Mass.
603, 85 N. ,E. 545.
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this was equally true of the tax on snuff and sugar. With regard
to the tax on carriages, however, there was a more serious dispute.-'
In Hylton v. United States72 the Supreme Court for the first
time passed upon the constitutionality of an act 3 of Congress."'
In a fictitious statement of facts it was alleged that the taxpayer
kept one hundred and twenty-five chariots "exclusively for the
defendant's own private use and not for hire." 5 Counsel on both
sides were paid by the government 0 and only three of the six
judges participated in the decision.7 However the three justices
were clearly of the opinion that the only direct taxes were taxes
on real property and the capitation tax. Paterson, one of the three
taking part in the case, had been a member of the convention, as
had Wilson, who expressed an opinion in the court below. The
latter justice did not join in the opinion of the Court but he did
say that his "sentiments in favor of the constitutionality of the
tax [had] not been changed."7 ,"
Thus the Supreme Court finally answered Rufus King's ques-
tion." Direct taxes are taxes on land. Capitation taxes and taxes
on land must be apportioned, all other taxes must be uniform.
Unless it can be said that the framers of the constitution intended
to adopt the pIhysiocrats' definition of a direct tax,8 0 those mem-
bers of the convention who afterwards had a hand in its practical
operation ignored the then current views of the economists.8 '
71Madison strongly opposed the measure as a direct tax. In a letter
dated May 11, 1794 he said: "The tax on carriages succeeded in spite of
the Constitution." 2 Madison (1865) 14. Hamilton, of course, favored it
since he had proposed a tax on carriages as early as 1790. 1 State Papers,
Finance 43.
72(1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 171, 1 L. Ed. 335.
73(1794) 1 Stat. at L. 373.
74(1935) 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 147.
75Ibid.
76Ibid.
77Chase, Paterson and Iredell. Cushing had been ill, Wilson gave no
opinion and Ellsworth was not sworn in until the day the decision was
delivered.
78(1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 171, 184, 185, 1 L. Ed. 335.
79During the course of the debates at the constitutional convention,
"Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation. No
one answered." 5 Madison (1865) 451.80
.e., all taxes except capitation and taxes on land may be shifted.
Hewett, The Definition of Income and Its Application in Federal Taxation,(1925) 1; see also Seligman, Is the Income Tax Constitutional and Just,
19 The 'Forum 48; West, The Income Tax and the National Revenue(1900) 8 J. of Pol. Econ. 433, 434.
s1"The Physiocrats and Adam Smith had recently made popular a dis-
tinction between direct and indirect taxes.' Spahr, The Supreme Court on
the Incidence and Effects of Taxation (1925) 1.
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Looking to the reason for the apportionment clauses 2 and realiz-
ing that the southern land and slaveholders had nothing to feat
from a uniform personal property tax, both Congress and the
Supreme Court reached the conclusion that there was no inten-
tion on the part of those who incorporated the apportionment re-
quirement into the Constitution to classify such taxes as direct.
The emergency internal revenue measures brought on by the
War of 1812 included the revival of the carriage,8 3 sugar refining,84
liquor license 5 and auction sales taxes.8 " In addition a staillp tax
on bonds, promissory notes and bills of exchange was introduced.87
These revenues proving inadequate, a tax on sundry manufactured
products 8 and a graduated tax on household furniture was enacted
in 1816.8
It should be noted that Congress again laid taxes on personal
property without any attempts at subterfuge. A personal property
tax was not a direct tax and there was no occasion to adopt a
"devious and delusive"90 method of achieving a result which could
be obtained by direct methods. The Hylton Case clearly explained
the apportionment provision, and Congress acted accordingly.
8sPaterson, J., a member of the constitutional convention, said that
"The provision was made in favor of the southern states. They possessed
a latge number of slaves; and had extensive tracts of territory, thinly
settled, and not very productive. A majority of the states had but few
slaves, and several of them a limited territory, well settled, and in a
high state of cultivation. The southern states, if no provision had been
introduced into the constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy
of other states. Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or
arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union at the same rate or meas-
ure: so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre in the sec-
ond. To guard them against imposition in these particulars, was the reason
of introducing the clause in the Constitution, which directs that representa-
tives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states, according to
their respective numbers." Hylton v. United States, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.)
171, 177, 1 L. Ed. 335.
83(1813) 3 Stat. at L. 40.
84(1813) 3 Stat. at L. 35.
s5(1813) 3 Stat. at L. 42 (distillers) ; (1813) 3 Stat. at L. 72 (dealers).
86(1813) 3 Stat. at L. 44.
87(1813) 3 Stat. at L. 77.
88The tax was laid on pig iron; castings, bar iron, rolled or slit
iron; nails, brads, and sprigs; and candles-all to be taxed at specified
rates according to weight. There was also a tax on hats and caps; uin-
brellas; paper; playing cards; beer, ale and porter; tobacco: manufactured
"segars" and snuff; leather and sundry leather products-all to be taxed
ad valorem. (1816) 3 Stat. at L. 180.
89(1816) 3 Stat. at L. 186.
90From the remarks of Sutherland, J., dissenting in Hale v. Iowa State
Board of Assessment and Review, (1937) 302 U. S. 95, 111, 58 Sup. Ct.
102, 108, 82 L. Ed. 72.
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Taxes levied on land in 1798,9' 1813,92 1814," and 181501 were
duly apportioned; all others were uniform.
Having had no occasion to employ subtle methods of drafts-
manship, the Civil War revenue acts were enacted in accordance
with the principles of the Hylton Case. In 1861 a tax on real
estate was enacted and duly apportioned. 5 The income tax was
uniform.96 Subsequent taxes on incomes,9 7 gross receipts, 8 busi-
nesses,99 transactions, 00 successions,10 ' auction sales -02 and com-
modities0 3 were not apportioned but met the requirement of uni-
formity.
Conforming to its earlier decisions, the Court interposed no
constitutional objection to these levies. In Pacific Ins.rance Co. v.
Soule"0 the tax on dividends and undistributed profits of insur-
ance companies was sustained. Veazie Bank v. Fen no'05 permitted
Congress to lay a prohibitive tax on state bank notes and while
there was some dissent as to the validity of the statute, there was
none on the ground that the tax was not apportioned. United
States'v. Singer0 0 sustained a tax on distillers, the minimum duty
to be not less than eighty per cent of the productive capacity of
the plant.
91(1798) 1 Stat. at L. 597 (levied to meet a treasury deficiency and to
pay debts due to the United States Bank).92(1813) 3 Stat. at L. 53.
93(1815) 3 Stat. at L. 164.
94(1816) 3 Stat. at L. 255.
95(1861) 12 Stat. at L. 292.
90(1861) 12 Stat. at L. 292.
97(1862) 12 Stat. at L. 432; (1864) 12 Stat. at L. 713; (1867) 14
Stat. at L. 471; (1870) 16 Stat. at L. 256. But see Curtis, The Revenue
Powers of the United States (1866) 33 Harper's Magazine 354, for a criti-
cism of this tax.98Gross receipts from toll-bridges and from passenger traffic of rail-
roads, boats and ferries; gross receipts of insurance companies; gross
receipts from advertising, (1862) 12 Stat. at L. 422; gross receipts of
express companies, (1863) 12 Stat. at L. 713; the gross receipts of tele-
graph companies, lotteries, theatres, operas, circuses and museums, (1864)
13 Stat. at L. 223.
99Some thirty-three businesses and professions were required to pay a
license tax. See Smith, The U. S. Federal Internal Tax History (1914)
167, 313-317.
LOOFor a list of legal instruments and proprietary articles subject to a
stamp tax see Smith, The U. S. Federal Internal Tax History, (1914)
304-310.
101(1862) 12 Stat. atL. 448.
102(1862) 12 Stat. at L. 432. During the following year sales of brokers
were also taxed, (1873) 13 Stat. at L. 223.
.
03The list of commodities subject to the tax was very comprehensive,
consisting chiefly of manufactured products, (1862) 12 Stat. at L. 432.104(1869) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 433, 19 L. Ed. 95.
050(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482.
106(1872) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 111, 21 L. Ed. 49.
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In Scholey v. RcwO07 the Court held that the right to take real
estate by descent or devise was a proper subject of an unappor-
tioned tax. In 1880 the Supreme Court in Springer v. United
States08 passed upon the validity of the income tax. After re-
viewing the background of the apportionment clause and the rea-
soning of the Hylton Case,09 the Court expressed its complete
agreement with the earlier decision. Since the only direct taxes
were "capitation taxes . . . and taxes on real estate,"'' and
since an income tax was neither a capitation tax nor a tax on
land, there was no necessity for apportionment.
III.
With the election of Cleveland in 1892 on a low tariff plat-
form, his inauguration in 1893 when the country was on the
verge of a financial panic, and with government expenses greatly
increased, the Democrats sought a solution to their fiscal prob-
lems."'1
On the basis of the opinions of the members of the constitu-
tional convention, the general understanding of the public, the
subsequent conduct of Congress, and the unbroken line of judi-
cial authority, no constitutional question seemed to be more com-
pletely settled than the power of Congress to tax income. Although
bitterly attacked as a socialistic measure, a tax of two per cent
of all income in excess of four thousand dollars was incorporated
in the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894.112
Immediately thereafter Charles Pollock, of Massachusetts,
filed a bill in equity against the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company
to enjoin compliance with the income act. It was alleged that the
defendant derived income from real estate and municipal bonds
and from other sources, that the directors of the defendant had
indicated an intention to pay the tax, and that such payment
would result in the misapplication of corporate funds because
there was no authority under the constitution for the collection of
an unapportioned income tax. On demurrer the circuit court dis-
missed the bill, dnd appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. By
107(1874) 23 Wall. (U.S.) 331, 23 L. Ed. 99.
108(1880) 102 U. S. 586, 26 L. Ed. 253.
°10 Hyltun v. United States, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 171, 1 L. Ed. 335.
11o(1880) 102 U. S. 586, 602, 26 L. Ed. 253.
211See Blakey, The Federal Income Tax (1940) 12-17. See also Howe,
The Federal Revenues and the Income Tax (1894) 4 Annals of the Amerl-
can Academy of Political Science 557.
112(1894) 28 Stat. at L. 509.
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a six-to-two vote the decision of the lower court was reversed."'
In its opinion the Court took the position that the Hylton Case
merely held that the tax on carriages could be sustained as an
excise.
"It will be perceived that each of the justices, while suggest-
ing doubt whether anything but a capitation or a land tax was a
direct tax within the meaning of the constitution, distinctly avoided
expressing an opinion upon that question or laying down a com-
prehensive definition, but confined his opinion to the case before
the court."' 14
The Court then proceeded to brush aside the Springer Case by
pointing out that the action in that case was one of ejectment by
the holder of a tax title acquired as the result of the sale of
Springer's land for taxes and that such title was valid if any part
of the tax giving rise to the sale could be sustained. Since part
of Springer's income had been derived from professional services,
the tax on such income could be justified as an excise."35
Since "it is conceded in all of these cases, from that of Hylton
to that of Springer, that taxes on land are direct taxes" and that
since the Court was "unable .to perceive any ground for the al-
leged, distinction" between a tax on land and a tax on the "profits
thereof," it was of the opinion that "the law in question, so far as
it levies a tax on the rents or income from real estate, is in viola-
tion of the constitution, and is invalid."11 6 (On rehearing, by a
five-to-four decision, the principle was extended to include in-
come from personal property.)"17
The Court then briefly distinguished Pacific Insurance Co. v.
Soule" and Railroad Company v. Collector." The Court said
that the tax in the Soule Case
"Was sustained on the ground that it was 'a duty or excise,'
. . . the decision turned on the distinction between an excise
"3 (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759; on rehearing,
(1895) 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108.
"14(1895) 157 U. S. 429, 571, 572, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 686, 39 L. Ed. 759.
"5157 U. S. 429, 578-581, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 688, 689, 39 L. Ed. 759.
.16(1895) 157 U. S. 429, 579, 583, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 689, 690, 39 L.
Ed. 759.
"'7Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 158 U. S. 601, 15
Sup. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108. The Court failed to mention in either
decision the case of Collector v. Day, (1863) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 1, 17 L.
Ed. 515 where it was said that "Congress possesses the power to collect
and lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and it is as competent for Con-
gress to tax annual gains and profits before they are divided among the
holders of the stock as afterwards, . . .Annual gains and profits, whether
divided or not, are property, and, therefore, are taxable."
318(1869) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 433, 19 L. Ed. 95.
139(1879) 100 U. S. 595, 25 L. Ed. 647.
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duty and a tax ... regarding the former a charge for a privilege,
or on the tranaction of a business, without any necessary refer-
ence to the amount of property belonging to those on whom the
charge might fall. 1"2
In Railrad Company v. Collector the Court said that the tax on
the interest payments of a corporation on its bonds had been held
to be "essentially an excise on the business of the class of corpora-
tions mentioned in the statute."' 2  However, an examination of
the statute involved in the two latter cases clearly indicates that
they were a part of the tax on personal incomes. Except for
banks, insurance companies and certain transportation companies,
the individual taxpayer was required to report as income the
entire profits of the corporations in which he had stock-regard-
less of whether or not such profits were distributed. In the case
of banks, insurance and transportation companies a different
method of taxing the individual was employed. The tax was col-
lected at the source, and the corporation was authorized to deduct
the tax from the amount of the dividend or interest payment.1
2 2
The shareholder or bondholder, having paid the tax at the source,
was not required to pay it again; consequently, the interest and
dividends received from such corporations were deductible from
gross income.1 21 Since the corporation was permitted to deduct
the tax from the amounts due stockholders and creditors, it is
evident that the tax was not imposed upon the corporation.
12
'
120(1895) 157 U. S. 429, 576, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 687, 39 L. Ed. 759.
"'1The opinion intimated that the Court deciding the case had not
given the question much thought since the justice writing the opinion had
remarked that "the sum involved in this suit is small. . . the law ...
long since repealed" and that "the case is of little consequence as regards
any principle involved in it as a rule of future action." (1895) 157 U. S.
429, 578, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 688, 39 L. Ed. 759.
22The Soule case involved sec. 120 and Collector v. Railroad Com-
pany sec. 122 of the 1864 income tax act. (13 Stat. at L. 223). Section
120 provided for a "duty of five percentum on all dividends . . . payable
' . to stockholders . . . [of banks and insurance companies] . . . and
all undistributed sums . . . added during the year to their surplus." Sec-
tion 122 applied to certain types of transportation companies and, in addi-
tion to the tax on dividends as required by sec. 120, required the payment
of a tax on the interest paid by such corporations on their indebtedness.
In both sections there were provisions authorizing the corporations "to
deduct and withhold from all payments on account of any dividends (and
interest in sec. 122) . . . the said tax of five percentum." Section 117 pro-
vided that the dividends of such corporations upon which the tax had been
duly paid should be deducted from the taxpayer's income.
"2This deduction was omitted in the Act of 1865. 13 Stat. at L. 469. 479.
124This was recognized in United States v. Railroad Company, (1873)
17 Wall. (U.S.) 322, 327, 21 L. Ed. 597, where the Court held the tax
invalid when laid on the interest paid by the railroad to the City of Balti-
more. Since the tax was "in substance and in law a tax upon the income
of the creditor" it could not be applied to a municipal corporation which
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Both in form and in substance the Civil War Act and the Act
of 1894 were excise taxes or they were income taxes. The Soulc,
Collector and Pollock Cases all involved corporate taxpayers,
yet in the first two decisions the tax was sustained as an excise,
while in the third the statute was held invalid because it was
an unapportioned tax on the income of a corporation derived
from real and personal propertyr and, therefore, "in substance"
a tax on such corporate property. If the Court could distinguish
an excise tax from an excise tax by calling one an income and
the other an excise tax and thus hold one invalid and the other
valid, there was some basis for the suspicion that Congress could
do the same thing.
IV.
On June 13, 1898 Congress passed an act to provide ways
and means to meet the expenditures of the Spanish-American
War.2 5 Among the taxes included therein was a duty on "legacies
and distributive shares of personal property." The tax was sus-
tained in Knowlton v. Moore2  by a court which was made up of
seven of the nine justices who had decided the Pollock Cases."5
was not the subject of taxation by Congress. This had been recognized by
Mr. Justice Field in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Erie Rail-
way Co., (1882) 106 U. S. 327, 331, 1 Sup. Ct. 223, 27 L. Ed. 151. "The
company is thus made the agent of the government for the collection of
the tax. It pays nothing itself; the tax is exacted from the creditor." Cf.
Bailey v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., (1882) 106 U. S. 109, 116,
1 Sup. Ct. 62, 68, 27 L. Ed. 81; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. United States,
(1883) 108 U. S. 228, 2 Sup. Ct. 482, 27 L. Ed. 711; Sioux City &
P. R. Co. v. United States (1884) 110 U. S. 205, 3 Sup. Ct. 565, 28 L. Ed.
120. "The amount withheld by corporations from the dividends of share-
holders should be allowed as a deduction since the tax is in reality a tax
upon the shareholder and its payment by the corporation is merely a mode
of collecting it." (1870) 10 Int. Rev. Rec. 9, Bump, Internal Rev. Laws
292. But even if it is assumed that the tax was on the corporation rather
than a tax on the shareholder, there is nothing in the statute to indicate
that Congress did not intend to lay an income tax on such corporation. Sec-
tions 120 and 122 fall under the subtitle INCOME in the Act of 1864 and
are between the sections pertaining to personal incomes generally and the
section taxing government officials and employees. Furthermore, with the
exception of the rate, the language of the earlier act laying "a duty of
five percentum on all dividends . . . and . . . sums added to the
surplus" is very much the same as that of the 1894 Act providing for "a
tax of two percentum . . . on the net profits . . . of . . . all cor-
porations!' It is not to be supposed that the use of the word "tax"
in one act and the word "duty" in the other influenced the Court's deter-
mination that the later act was unconstitutional as an income tax while
the earlier act was valid as an excise. Cf. Graves, Inherent Improprieties
in the Income Tax Amendment to the Federal Constitution, (1910) 19
Yale L. J. 505, 507.
125(1898) 20 Stat. at L. 448.
126(1900) 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969.
2-7Field and Jackson had been replaced by Peckham and McKenn2.
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Although the case was decided by a five-to-three vote,' two of
the dissents involved a question of statutory interpretation, while
the third objected only to the progressive rate provision. Mr.
Justice White, in delivering the opinion of the Court, pointed out
that "death duties, generally, have been from the beginning of all
countries considered as different from taxes levied on property ;"
the Pollock Case did not require the application of the economist's
test of shiftability in determining whether a tax was direct or
indirect, it did not overrule Scholey vu. Row,23 and therefore, "the
tax under consideration was not direct under the constitution."13 0
In Spreckles Sugar Refining Company v. McClain""' the court
sustained a tax of one-fourth of one per cent on the gross receipts
of a sugar refinery in excess of $250,000 saying that
"Clearly the tax is not imposed upon gross annual receipts as
property, but only in respect of the carrying on or doing the
business of refining sugar. It cannot be otherwise regarded be-
cause of the fact that the amount of the tax is measured by the
amount of the gross annual receipts. The tax is defined in the act
as 'a special excise tax,' and, therefore it must be assumed, for
what it is worth, that Congress has no purpose to exceed its
powers under the Constitution, but only to exercise the authority
granted to it of laying and collecting excises."
During the same term the tax on the sale of stock by brokers
was sustained in Thomas v. United States.1 82 The Court pointed
out that "taxes of this sort have been repeatedly sustained . . .
and distinguished from direct taxes" citing, among others, the
Hylton Case,133 Nicol v. Ames, 34 which sustained the federal tax
on sales at exchanges or boards of trade, and Treat v. White,'8
which permitted a tax on "call" sales of shares of stock by brokers.
The latter two cases were decided after Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., and were thought to be in no way inconsistent with
the holding in that case.
In Patton v. Brady3 0 a second "excise" tax on tobacco was
said to be a "tax on the article manufactured for consumption"
and that "it is within the power of Congress to increase an excise,
as well as a property tax, at least while the property is held for
'2sPeckham, J., took no part in the decision.
129Supra, page 436.
130(1900) 178 U. S. 41, 78-83, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969.
181(1904) 192 U. S. 397, 411, 24 Sup. Ct. 376, 380, 48 L. Ed. 496.
132(1904) 192 U. S. 363, 24 Sup. Ct. 305, 48 L. Ed. 481.
13(1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 171, 1 L. Ed. 556.
134(1898) 173 U. S. 509, 19 Sup. Ct. 522, 43 L. Ed. 786.
235(1901) 181 U. S. 264, 21 Sup. Ct. 611, 45 L. Ed. 853.
230(1902) 184 U. S. 608, 623, 22 Sup. Ct. 493, 499, 46 L. Ed. 713.
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sale." But any uncertainty as to the power to tax property even in
the hands of the consumer had been settled in 1796, and any
doubt as to the status of the Hylton Case resulting from the
Pollock decision was set at rest by Billings v. United States13 1
where the Court held that a tax on foreign-built yachts was a
proper exercise of the federal taxing power.
Although the Pollock Case provoked considerable litigation
during the years immediately following its decision, it did not
prevent Congress from exercising its power to enact those usual
and customary taxes which had their inception in the acts of
1791 and 1794.138 Congress was permitted to tax personal prop-
erty before the Pollock Case, and the decisions thereafter indi-
cated no tendency to deprive Congress of a large part of its tax-
ing power. A tax on carriages was sustained in 1793, and a tax
on foreign-built yachts sustained in 1914. The suggestion in the
Hylton opinion that a tax on personal property was not a direct
tax within the meaning of the constitution found its strongest
support in Patton v. Brady, decided in 1902. If Congress may lay
a recurring "excise" tax on property,139 any substantial difference
between the two types of taxes, so far as any constitutional
question is concerned, is non-existent. The Pollock decision, be-
cause of the Court's subsequent refusal to consider matters of
substance, gave rise to the anomalous doctrine that, in effect,
Congress could tax personal property, but could not tax the in-
come from personal property. A tax on the income from property
was equivalent to a tax on property, and was invalid unless ap-
portioned; but a recurring "excise" tax on property was not
equivalent to a tax on property. As was said in the Nicol Case,
the tax was not to be "upon the business itself which is so trans-
acted, but it is a duty upon the facilities made use of and actually
employed in the transaction of business.114 0 In Spreckles Sugar
Refining Co. v. McClain, it was not the gross receipts which
were taxed, the tax was "only in respect of the carrying on or
137(1914) 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 596.
"3S"The decisions of the Supreme Court may fall like thunderbolts from
Almighty Jove. There is a blinding flash, perhaps some spectacular damage
to a restricted area. Temporarily there is terror and repentance. But soon
calm is resumed and with it confidence that, granted a proper observance
of prescribed rituals and occasional adaptation of their form to the whims
of an angry god, there is likely to be very little interference with the
actual plans of those who walk the earth below." Foster, Conflicting Ideals
for Reorganization, (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 923, 927, 928.
13aThe tax in Billings v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup.
Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 596, was an annual tax.
140(1898) 173 U. S. 509, 519, 19 Sup. Ct 522, 527, 43 L. Ed. 786.
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doing business of refining sugar."' 41 And in Knowlton v. Moore
the Court was careful to say that the tax did not relate "to prop-
erty eo nomine," but only "to its passage by will or
intestacy.' 1
2
Thus the second Pollock decision, which expanded "direct
taxes" to include personal as well as real property, required only
that a tax on personal property be given a name other than that
of a personal property tax. The difference between a direct tax
on personal property and an indirect tax was nothing more than
a matter of form-its constitutionality was to be determined by
its label and not by its effect.
V.
Because of the political, economic and personal elements which
surrounded the enactment and invalidation of the Act of 1894,
there was deep resentment and disappointment on the part of
those who saw in the income tax a more satisfactory method of
raising revenue. 143 Many believed that all matters deserving of
consideration had not been brought to the attention of the Court,
and that a properly drafted statute would meet the constitutional
objection of the Pollock Case. Judge Taft, in his speech accepting
the nomination for the presidency, said that "I believe that an
income tax . . . can and should be devised which, under the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, will conform to the constitution.'' "
During the Special Session of 1909 there was a strong drive
for the enactment of a personal and corporate income tax sub-
stantially identical with that of the Act of 1894.4 14r However,
President Taft forestalled this attempt. In a message to Congress
on June 6, 1909, the president recommended first, a tax on cor-
341(1904) 192 U. S. 397, 411, 24 Sup. Ct. 376, 3801 48 L. Ed. 481. The
distinctions between direct taxes and excises were said to be "often very
difficult to be expiessed in words." (1904) 192 U. S. 397, 413, 24 Sup. Ct.
305, 281, 48 L. Ed. 481.
142(1900) 178 U. S. 41, 47, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 750, 44 L. Ed. 969.
143"It is not easy to find another decision which so openly departs
from the law in order to shelter privilege." Bascom, Growth of Nation-
ality in the United States. For a general discussion of the background of
the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909 and the sixteenth amendment see
Blakey, The Federal Income Tax (1940) ch. 2. See also, Bizzell, Judicial
Interpretation of Political Theory (1914) ch. 9.
144N. Y. Daily Tribune, July 29, 1908. For an earlier, but unfavor-
able statement of the current view see West, The Income Tax and the
National Revenues, (1900) 8 J. Pol. Econ. 433. Cf. Borah, Income Tax
Sound in Law and Economics, (1910) 10 Journal of Accountancy 26.
145See Blakey, The Federal Income Tax (1940) ch. 2; Anderson, The
Problem of Tax-Exempt Securities (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw
273, 278.
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porations measured by annual income and second, a constitutional
amendment which would give the federal government "the power
to levy an income tax without apportionment among the states
in proportion to population." The amendment was recommended
because
"this course is much to be preferred to the one proposed of re-
enacting a law once judicially declared to be unconstitutional. For
Congress to assume, that the Court will reverse itself, and to enact
legislation on such an assumption will not strengthen popular
confidence in the stability of judicial construction of the con-
stitution."'"1
In the interest of harmony, a compromise was reached and the
C6rporation Excise Tax of 1909 became law.147
Since only two of the justices'4" who decided the Pollock Cases
were still on the bench when the validity of the Corporation Ex-
cise Tax came before the Court, and since these hvo members had
registered the only dissent in the first case and wrote two of the
four strong dissenting opinions" 9 in the second decision, it was
not surprising that the tax was sustained 50 However, instead of
overruling the Pollock decision the Court solemnly distinguished
the two taxes. Evidetitly the president's -warning about destroy-
ing public confidence was taken to heart, because the Court dis-
covered that the "difference between the acts is not merely
nominal, but rests upon substantial differences between the mere
ownership of property and the actual doing of business in a cer-
tain way: 151
The Act of 189452 laid a tax "on the net profits of all corpora-
tions," while the 1909 Act 5 3 provided that "every corporation
. .. shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with re-
spect to the carrying on or doing business . . . equivalent to one
percentum upon the entire net income." Except for the difference
14615 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 7390. Cf. Pennoyer, The
Income Tax Decision, and the Power of the Supreme Court to Nullify
Acts of Congress, (1895) 29 Am. L. Rev. 550, 590.
147(1909) 36 Stat. at L. 11.
14'White and Harlan, JJ.
"493rown, J. and Jackson, J. also wrote separate dissenting opinions.
" 'S°Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 343. 55
L. Ed. 389. The opinion was written by Day, J. for a unanimous Court.
Cf. Eliot v. Freeman, (1911) 220 U. S. 178, 31 Sup. CL 360. 55 L. Ed.
424; Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate, (1911) 220 U. S. 187, 31 Sup. Ct.
361, 55 L. Ed. 428; 'McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., (1913) 228
U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842.
is,(1911) 220 U. S. 107, 150, 31 Sup. Ct. 343, 349, 55 L. Ed. 389.
:152(1894) 28 Stat. at L. 509.
-53(1909) 36 Stat at L. 11.
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in language, it is difficult to discover any other distinguishing
characteristic. Both statutes taxed corporations, in both the
amount of the tax was determined by the income of the tax-
payer, and in both the income included profits from land and
from tangible and intangible personal property-including interest
from tax exempt securities. Perhaps the "substantial difference"
was found in the fact that in the Act of 1894 Congress called
an income tax an income tax, but in the Act of 1909 Congress
called an income tax an excise. Whatever the difference may have
been, it was sufficient to sustain the validity of the tax. There
was no need to lose "popular confidence" by overruling an un-
popular decision so long as a tenuous distinction could be used
to obtain the same result-or, at least, to obtain that which at
the time seemed to be the same result.
VI.
Immediately following the adoption of the sixteenth amend-
ment, the Court showed a disposition to consider the income tax
as an excise. In Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.,154 the Court had
occasion to pass upon the validity of the depletion provision of
the 1913 Act. The deduction was limited to five per cent of the
gross value of the output of the mine, and it was objected that
the January 1, 1909 value of the capital represented by the ores
extracted during the year greatly exceeded the five per cent de-
duction permitted by the statute. Accordingly it was argued that
to the extent that actual depletion (based on January 1, 1909
value) exceeded allowed depletion such excess represented a re-
turn of capital and being capital, Congress could not subject it
to an unapportioned tax.
The Court, however, sustained the arbitrary five per cent de-
pletion limitation. Mr. Chief Justice White, who had dissented
in both of the Pollock Cases, observed that the purpose of the
sixteenth amendment was to prevent the Court from taking in-
come taxes out of the
"category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged,
and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to appor-
tionment by a consideration of the sources from which the
income was derived-that is, by testing the tax not by what it
was, a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from
the origin of source of the income taxed."155
The Chief Justice then concluded that
154(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 60 L. Ed. 546.
155(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 112, 113, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 281, 60 L. Ed. 546.
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"independently of the effect of the operation of the sixteenth
amendment it was settled in Stratton's Independence v. Ho-wbcrt,
231 U. S. 399, that such a tax is not a tax upon property as
such because of its ownership, but a true excise levied on the
results of the business of carrying on mining operations.' u 50
The Court was dearly of the opinion that the tax in question
could be sustained as an excise. The taxpayer was engaged in
business and a tax could be laid upon such activity. The fact that
the word "income" had been used to describe the tax did not pre-
vent the Court from considering it in the light of a permissiblc
excise. As had been said in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R.
Co. 1 57 decided earlier in the same term,
"the Pollock Case . .. recognized the fact that taxation on
income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such
unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount
to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to appor-
tionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent."'u 8
The sixteenth amendment
"does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in
a generic sense,--an authority already possessed . . . the whole
purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when
imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source
whence the income was derived."'159
If the income tax was to be considered as an excise, then
it was not necessary to look to the measure of the tax. As in all
excises, if the tax were levied upon the proper subject, no con-
stitutional problem could successfully be raised as to its measure-
at least so long as the measure bore some reasonable relationship
to the subject being taxed. The Pollock Case had warped the
excise on incomes into a direct tax, but the sixteenth amendment
had restored it to its former shape. Therefore, the Court in the
Stanto Case could accept the taxpayer's assumption that the
tax in question was a tax, in part, upon capital. That made no
difference. An income tax was an excise and not "direct," and it
could be measured by capital. The failure to detect this was "the
obvious error of the proposition intrinsically considered" when it
was argued by the taxpayer that the tax was on the gross product
of the mine, that it was a direct tax and therefore was void for
want of apportionment 60
156(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 114, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 281, 60 L. Ed. 493.
257(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct 236, 60 L. Ed. 493.
158(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 16, 17, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 241, 60 L. Ed. 493.
259(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 17, 18, 36 Sup. Ct 236, 241, 60 L. Ed. 493.
160(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 112, 36 Sup. Ct 278, 281, 60 L. Ed. 493.
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But even if this were not true, the taxation of the product of
a mine was not a direct tax on such product, but was an excise
levied on the results of "the business of carrying on mining op-
erations." A tax on capital had been sustained as an excise in
Stratton's Independence v. Howbert,"'8 and the act of 1913 could
be sustained in the same manner. As had been said in the Howbert
Case
"Congress, in exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject
of taxation as a franchise or privilege, was not debarred by the
constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income,
although derived in part from property which, considered by it-
self, was not taxable. It was reasonable that Congress should fix
upon gross income, without distinction as to source, as a con-
venient and sufficiently accurate index of the importance of the
business transacted.''
2
The companion case to Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., Tyee
Realty Co. v. Anderson,'"3 involved the limitation on the deduc-
tion of interest expense. It was argued that the denial of the full
deduction for interest paid resulted in the taxation of something
more than "income in the true sense of the word." The argu-
ment was ignored by the Court, as it had been in the Brushaber
Case," and the tax sustained.
It thus seems clear that in 1916 the Supreme Court fully ac-
cepted the income tax as an excise tax and refused to consider any
questions relating to the measure of the tax.1 "1 If this had not
been amply demonstrated by the Brushaber and Stanton Cases, it
was clearly indicated by the holding in the Tyee decision. It may
be argued that the Brushaber Case merely rejected a blanket ob-
jection to the 1913 Act; and that the Stanton Case may be ra-
tionalized on the ground that Congress was taxing income as that
word was commonly understood at the time of the adoption of
the sixteenth amendment.' 6 But interest payments have been gen-
161(1913) 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L. Ed. 285.
162(1913) 231 U. S. 399, 416, 417, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 142, 58 L. Ed. 285.
183(1916) 240 U. S. 115, 36 Sup. Ct. 281, 60 L. Ed. 554.
164This argument was one of the many "minute" and "hypercritical"
contentions made by the taxpayer. (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 24, 36 Sup. Ct. 236,
244, 60 L. Ed. 493.
165"The amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the
future with the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided."
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60
L. Ed. 493.
166"Until the passage of the sixteenth amendment to the constitution of
the United States, under which an income tax could be levied on individ-
uals and corporations, it was usual for mining companies to carry their
properties at the sum of the amount of the stock issued for properties thus
acquired plus the cash paid for subsequent additions. Provision for exhaus-
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erally regarded as an expense which must be deducted from re-
ceipts in order to determine income. The inclusion of this expense
could not be sustained as being within the "common understand-
ing of the meaning of the word."
Within less than three years after the adoption of the sixteenth
amendment the Supreme Court apparently accepted the principle
that in taxing income Congress was not limited to net income.
The Court further intimated that it would not concern itself too
greatly with the measure of the tax. Such problems were put to
rest when the amendment restored the income tax to the "cate-
gory of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged."
VII.
Unfortunately the restoration was only temporary. The
Pollock decision had made two radical changes in the federal
taxing power. First, it broadened the concept of a direct tax
from that of an ordinary tax on realty to a tax which included
all property. Second, it introduced the doctrine that a tax on the
income from property was substantially a tax on the property
itself and was invalid unless apportioned.
When President Taft insisted upon a constitutional amend-
ment instead of a reversal of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., and when the Supreme Court gave no indication in Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co. that an amendment was not necessary, a number
of constitutional questions were unnecessarily created.
The sixteenth amendment gave Congress the power to "lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, with-
out apportionment." Its immediate purpose was to remove the
second limitation upon the federal taxing power which had been
introduced by the Pollock Case. No mention was made of the
first limitation, and consequently it was impossible to ascertain
from the letter of the amendment whether the Hylton interpreta-
tion or the Pollock interpretation of "direct taxes" was to be
followed in the future. Yet the fact that an income tax had been
secured through an amendment to the constitution rather than by
the simpler expedient of a legislative reenactment of the 1894 Act
may have been significant. At least the Court in Brushaber v.
Union Pacific R. R. Co. 1 67 appeared to think that the amend-
tion or depletion of mining properties in the financial accounts was rare."
Peloubet, Natural Resources Assets-Their Treatment in Accounts and
Valuation, (1937) 16 Harv. Bus. Rev. 74, 75-76.167(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493.
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ment had an indirect effect upon the first point involved in the
Pollock decision.
". .. it is to be observed that although from the date
of the Hylton Case, because of the statements made in the opinions
in that case, it had come to be accepted that direct taxes in the
constitutional sense were confined to taxes levied directly on
real estate because of its ownership, the amendment contains
nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case
that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it embraced
also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its
ownership, and therefore the amendment at least impliedly makes
such wider significance a part of the constitution,-a condition
which clearly demonstrates that the purpose was not to change
the existing interpretation. .. ."101
If the amendment incorporated the doctrine of the Pollock
Case into the constitution with respect to the first limitation, it
was entirely possible that the Court would make the coalescence
complete by attributing to any tax designated by Congress as an
"income tax" all of the qualities of a direct tax. That is, if an
income tax laid on income from property was essentially a direct
tax, a fortiori an income tax laid on property itself was a direct
tax. The sixteenth amendment removed the requirement of appor-
tionment of an income tax which taxed income, but it in no way
mentioned an income tax which taxed property. Although the
Court had frequently sustained taxes on property after the Pollock
decision, these taxes were in the form of excises; any attempt
to tax the same property by an income tax would inevitably meet
the objection that it was a direct tax and void because not appor-
tioned. As has been seen, this objection was made and rejected in
the Brushaber, Stanton and Tyee Cases. Unfortunately, these
decisions were not taken very seriously. The lasting effect of the
Pollock decision in linking the income tax with the direct tax
clause of the constitution was more than enough to overcome the
rationale of those cases.
In Tomze v. Eisnere'9 the taxpayer brought an action to re-
cover income taxes paid upon stock dividends. Augustus N. Hand,
District Judge, prefaced his remarks as follows:
"Gains and profits from business can only be taxed under the
present Income Tax Act by virtue of ownership of the property
from which they are derived. They are not, like excise taxes,
based upon the earnings of a business, corporate or otherwise.
They are direct taxes, under the decision of the Supreme Court
168(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 19, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 242, 60 L. Ed. 493.
169(S.D. N.Y. 1917) 242 Fed. 702.
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in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., and would have to be
apportioned, but for the recent enactment of the sixteenth amend-
ment to the constitution . .. Now it is manifest that the stock
dividend in question cannot be reached by the Income Tax Act,
and could not, even though Congress expressly declared it to be
taxable as income, unless it is in fact income."',70
However, his remarks were unnecessary to the decision, since
it was decided that stock dividends "possess the real essentials
of income" and the tax was, therefore, constitutional.
When the case reached the Supreme Court-it was reversed.'7 '
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said that "we can-
not doubt that the dividend was capital . . . for the purposes of
the Income Tax Law. .... 172
Unlike the 1913 Act,173 which was before the Court in To'wne
v. Eisner, the 1916 Act"74 contained an express provision laying
a tax on stock dividends.175 When the taxpayer brought an action
to recover taxes paid on a stock dividend, the same district court
which had decided the Tozmw Case held the statute unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the
judgment below. 78
Mr. Justice Pitney, writing the opinion for the Court, accepted
the premise of the Pollock Case that
"taxes upon rents and profits of: real estate and upon returns
from investments of personal property were in effect direct taxes
.. and that Congress could not impose such taxes without appor-
tioning them. .. ."277
The sixteenth amendment merely removed the necessity which
otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of
taxes laid on income. In order that the apportionment require-
ment be given
"proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amend-
ment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes
essentialto distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,'
as the- term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases
arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to
form."7 8
170(S.D. N.Y. 1917) 242 Fed. 702, 704.
T''Towne v. Eisner, (1918) 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 62 L. Ed. 372.172(1918) 245 U. S. 418, 426, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 159, 62 L. Ed. 372.
173(1913) 38 Stat. at L. 166.
174(1916) 39 Stat. at L. 756.
"75 Sec. 2(a).
'38Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U..S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct 189, 64 L.
Ed. 521.
177(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 205, 40 Sup. Ct 189, 192, 64 L. Ed. 521.
178252 U. S. 189, 206, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193, 64 L. Ed. 521.
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Thus the association of the income tax with the direct tax
continued after the amendment. To Mr. Justice Pitney the in-
come tax remained essentially a direct tax relieved of the neces-
sity of apportionment only so far as the tax fell literally within
the language of the amendment-and the Stanton and Brushaber
Cases were cited as authority for this view I
The reference to "truth and substance" in connection with a
controversy over whether the'tax was direct or indirect clearly
indicated the decision of the Court. As early as the Hylton Case
it had been recognized that "some taxes may be both direct and
indirect at the same time" and still valid as excises.7 0 Few taxes
could be sustained as excises if the Court should insist on mat-
ters of substance. As Mr. Justice Holmes tersely remarked in
his dissent: "The known purpose of the amendment was to get
rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes." 80
The failure to appraise correctly the force of the term "income"
was said to be a "fundamental error" on the part of the govern-
ment."" An income tax could not be used to tax that which was
not income. Yet in the Stanton Case the "obvious error" of the
taxpayer was the proposition that an income tax could not be
used to tax that which was not income. 82 The situation was made
more obscure by the fact that the Chief Justice wrote the opinion
in the Stanton Case and agreed with the majority in the Macombar
decision. The earlier opinion related exclusively to the considera-
tion of excise taxes; the later decision made no mention of them.
Within a period of three years the attitude of the Court had
changed entirely. "Fundamentally," an income tax had again
changed from an excise to a direct tax.1813
By 1924 the philosophy of the Pollock and Macomber Cases
had become so thoroughly established that the Court, in Edwards
v. Cuba Railroad Co.1 4 held that subsidies paid from 1911 to 1916
170(1796) 3 DalI. (U.S.) 171, 174, 1 L. Ed. 556.
18o(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 220, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 197, 198, 64 L. Ed. 521.
181 (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 213, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 195, 64 L. Ed. 521.
1s"See supra, page 445.
8l3Following Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct.
189, 64 L. Ed. 521, the lower federal courts emphasized the distinction
between an income tax and an excise. For example, in United States v.
Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co., (E.D. Pa. 1920) 262 Fed. 188, 190, it was
said that "There is, of course, a fundamental difference between an income
tax and an excise tax . . . An income tax . . . is a direct tax imposed
upon the thing called income, and is directly imposed as is a tax on
land." See also, Cadwalader v. Lederer, (E.D. Pa. 1921) 273 Fed. 879
and Brewster v. Walsh, (D. Conn. 1920) 268 Fed. 207.
184(1925) 268 U. S. 628, 633, 45 Sup. Ct. 614, 615, 69 L. Ed. 1124.
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inclusive by the Republic of Cuba to a New' Jersey corporation
'"sere not profits or gains from the use or operation of the rail-
road, and do not constitute income within the meaning of the
sixteenth amendment." Although the case could have been de-
cided solely with reference to the meaning of the various income
tax statutes under consideration, the Court rested its decision
on the basis of unconstitutionality. If Congress should attempt
to tax similar payments to corporations, the tax would have to
be the result of the exercise of some power other than that pro-
vided by the sixteenth amendment. Congress did not intend to
tax-the subsidies under the 1909 Act and could not tax them under
the sixteenth amendment income tax statutes. Any intention on
the part of Congress to tax such payments in the future would
have to be clearly expressed in an excise tax; it would be un-
constitutional if contained in an income tax.
- VIII.
Within ten years after the adoption of the sixteenth amend-
ment the Supreme Court had established two lines of authority
relating to the subject of taxable income.1 85 One line, based on
the idea that an income tax was an excise, permitted the taxation
of capital. The other line of authority, based on the premise that
the income tax was essentially a direct tax, denied Congress the
right to tax capital. The first series of cases had arisen under the
deduction provisions of the Act while the second had arisen under
the provisions relating to inclusions in gross income; yet this
should have made no difference in the result.180 Income, the
Court has frequently remarked, is a constitutional concept, and
constitutional concepts are not defeated by mere matters of
form. 8 7 If Congress may not tax capital in its pure state, it
should not be permitted to tax capital when diluted with large
1SS"In income tax legislation we have grown accustomed to thinking of
gross income, on the one hand, and of deductions, on the other hand, as two
rather distinct and separate groups of items. This custom has become so
imbedded in our collective minds that it has induced us to accept as a
fundamentally established principle of taxation, at least of Federal income
taxation and in some degree of all income tax legislation, the familiar and
oft repeated statement that the legislative bodies are restricted in providing
what may be included in gross income but have complete and uncontrolled
discretion in providing or failing to provide for the allowance of deduc-
tions." Walsh, Actual Income Versus Taxable Income under the 1934
Act-Deductions, (1935) 13 Tax Mag. 255, 256.
' 86See Pitney, J., in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., (1918) 247 U. S.
179, 188, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 470, 692 L. Ed. 1054.
'
87Weiss v. Steam, (1924) 265 U. S. 242. 254, 44 Sup. Ct. 490, 492,
68 L. Ed. 1001.
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quantities of income. If Congress may not include capital in
gross income when it is unmixed with profits, it should be per-
mitted to require the inclusion of an obvious mixture of income
and capital in gross income only upon the condition that the
mixture be sorted and the capital deducted from the aggregate.
On the ofher hand, if Congress may tax capital by an unappor-
tioned tax, then it should not matter whether the tax is in the
form of an excise tax or in the form of an "income" tax-as long
as the tax has substantially the same effect the form of the
statute should not determine its constitutionality. But such was
not the effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court.
When confronted with a problem involving deductions from
gross income the courts had two alternatives. Deductions could
properly be denied by Congress on the authority of the depletion
cases, or they could be demanded as a matter of right by the tax-
payer on the authority of the dividend cases. However, the selec-
tion of the alternative was not a difficult problem, since there
were only a limited number of possible cases which could present
clear instances of property taxation. Congress in the exercise of
its power under the sixteenth amendment had been generous in
its allowance of deductions from gross income,1 88 and there were
few opportunities for the courts to elaborate upon the direct tax
concept of the income tax. At the same time it was inevitable
that the deduction provisions would give rise to litigation. The
necessity of distinguishing between capital and income would
give the courts an opportunity to greatly expand or sharply limit
the influence of the Brushaber, Stanton and Tyee Cases.
In New Creek Co. v. Lederer189 the taxpayer argued that none
of its royalties could be taxed as income until the 1913 value of
such receipts had been recovered. The commissioner rejected the
contention and prorated the 1913 value of the royalties over the
estimated amount of ores in place on that date. Relying upon
the 1909 excise and 1913 income tax-depletion cases the Court,
in sustaining the Commissioner, said:
"Whatever right a corporate mine owning taxable had to
deduct from the gross income of its mine anything for deprecia-
tion or depletion came to it solely by virtue of the statute under
which the tax was assessed."190
Shortly thereafter the same court, in Ludington v. Mc-
881Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 393.
189(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 295 Fed. 433.
19o (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 295 Fed. 433, 435.
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Caughn,'9' had occasion to determine the basis for computing the
deductible loss resulting from the sale of stock. Since the Civil
War income tax acts and those of 1894 and 1913 had made no
provision for the deduction of such losses, it was assumed that
there was no constitutional question invblved. Therefore "Con-
gress may allow or disallow them at will and upon any basis.
Taxable gain is a constitutional concept . . . while deductible loss
is a creation of Congress."'-92
During the following year two additional cases contained
language basically inconsistent with the- direct tax theory of in-
come taxes. Jn Westerfield v. Rafferty""3 a federal district court,
in sustaining a tax on the "profits" from the sale of land without
permitting the deduction of the carrying charges, emphasized the
fact that "the tax and the method of arriving at it is purely statu-
tory." And in Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas'" an-
other federal district court was even more emphatic. Although,
as in the Ludington Case, its decision was in favor of the tax-
payer, the Court remarked that
"Congress had the power to require the payment of the tax
without allowing any deduction for the purpose of returning to
the taxpayer his entire invested capital at the expiration of the
life of the property from which the income was derived.' 0 3
Some four years elapsed before there was again express men-
tion of the statutory nature of income tax deductions.1 0 In de-
termining the amount of the deductible loss resulting from the
sale of securities the Board of Tax Appeals said:
"As we interpret the power of Congress to levy an income
tax, there is no requirement that Congress permit the deduction
of every kind of loss that may be sustained by a taxpayer. The
deduction of a loss from income received is purely a matter of
grace.' 97
191 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 689.
192(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 689, 692.
193(E.D. N.Y. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 590, 592.
194 (W.D. Ky. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 723.
195 (W.D. Ky. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 723, 728.
'96Bloch v. Commissioner, (1929) 16 B. T. A. 425.
1
9 7 (1929) 16 B. T. A. 425, 430. During the same year the circuit court
of appeals for the second circuit in American Can Co. v. Bowers, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 832, 835, cert. denied, 281 U. S. 736, 50 Sup. Ct.
249, had occasion to reject a request for the use of an inventory based
on "normal stocks" which had been adopted by the corporate taxpayer for
the purpose of minimizing the fluctuations in its annual profits and losses
resulting from violent price changes in its tin inventories. In emphasizing
the statutory nature of the income tax the Court said: "Necessarily, net
income, for tax purposes, is a conception of the income tax statute, and
the amount arrived at is ascertained by deducting from the gross amount
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During the ten years following Eisner v. Macomber'98 only
a few cases contained statements which inherently accepted the
excise concept of taxable income. Of the cases mentioned above,
two involved the deduction of losses 1 9 and the remainder pre-
sented the problem of determining when'00 a deduction could be
taken. Yet even at this early period of development some of the
courts indicated a tendency to use language broad enough to
cover all deductions-as if there were no differences of degree
or kind among them. Although infrequently cited, these cases
used most of the various methods of expressing the idea that
deductions are not required by the constitution. It is significant
that the first of these cases cited Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.,201
a decision where the Supreme Court was "exclusively concerned
with the nature of an income tax as essentially an excise.''
2
In sharp contrast with the mild and carefully guarded state-
ments made prior to 1930, the language used after that date rela-
tive to the power of Congress to limit or deny deductions from
gross income became much more emphatic and inclusive. In
Phipps v. Bowers20  a district court, in sustaining a provision
denying the right to deduct interest on loans used to purchase
tax-exempt securities, made this sweeping statement:
"That it is within the power of Congress to determine what
deductions, if any, may be taken from gross income in arriving
at net income, is not open to question unless the result be undue
discrimination.'
04
of income received by the taxpayer from all sources the specified deduction
allowed to it by statute. For corporate purposes only, it may well be, on
the other hand, that net income may be arrived at by the deduction of
entries and accounts which are not permissible for the purpose of taxation."
198(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521.
199Ludington v. McCaughn, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 689, and
Bloch v. Commissioner, (1929) 16 B. T. A. 425.20ONew Creek Co. v. Lederer, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 295 Fed. 433
(royalty value prorated); Westerfield v. Rafferty (E.D. N.Y. 1925) 4 F.
(2d) 590 (carrying charges deducted in year paid and not capitalized);
Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, (W.D. Ky. 1925) 5 F. (2d)
723 (value of contract prorated); American Can Co. v. Bowers, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 832 (losses on inventories deducted in year
suffered).201(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 60 L. Ed. 546.
202Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 310.
2os(S.D. N.Y. 1930) 46 F. (2d) 164, aff'd (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 49
F. (2d) 996, cert. denied, (1931) 284 U. S. 641, 52 Sup. Ct. 22, 76 L. Ed. 545.
'04(S.D. N.Y. 1930) 46 F. (2d) 164, 167. This statement was followed by
a quotation from New York, N. H. & H. R. v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1920) 269 Fed. 907, 910, a case which discussed the provision in the
Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 limiting the interest expense of cor-
porations. In Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir.
1930) 43 F. (2d) 78, 79, cert. denied, (1931) 284 U. S. 654, 52 Sup. Ct.
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However, the Supreme Court at first refused to accept these
broad statements concerning the statutory nature of deductions.
In Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co.,2 5 a case involving the
depletion basis for an oil well, the court said:
"The parties agree that respondent is not entitled as a mat-
ter of right to make any deduction from annual income for de-
pletion of the oil extracted and sold during the year. If it may take
any such deduction, authority therefore must be fQund in the
statute. (Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.)" 2 0 0
It should be observed that the Court did not say that all de-
ductions were purely statutory, it merely said that any deduc-
tion for depletion must be authorized by statute. Yet of the
eleven cases citing the Thompson Case as authority for the prin-
ciple that deductions are statutory, only two of them limit their
remarks to deductions for depletion..2 07 The remainder cite it
for the rule that all deductions are matters of congressional dis-
cretion.2
0 S
33, 76 L. Ed. 554, decided in the same year, the federal court did not
qualify its remarks even on the question of discrimination. In rejecting the
proposal of the taxpayer to deduct estimated expenses incurred under a
state workman's compensation statute instead of the actual payments
made to injured employees, the Court said that "Deductions from income
may not be made unless authorized by statute."205-(1931) 283 U. S. 301, 51 Sup. Ct. 418, 75 L. Ed. 1049.
206(1931) 283 U. S. 301, 304, 51 Sup. Ct. 418, 419, 75 L. Ed. 1049.
Cf. Pugh v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 76, 77, cert.
denied, (1931) 284 U. S. 642, 52 Sup. Ct. 22, where it was said that "a
deduction from gross income can be claimed only as authorized by statute."
See also, Planters' Cotton Oil Co. v. Hopkins, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) 53
F. (2d) 825, 826, aff'd (1932) 286 U. S. 332, 52 Sup. Ct. 509, 76 L. Ed.
1135, a case involving an attempt to carry over the losses of a predeces-
sor corporation. In denying the deduction the Court said that "The rights
of claimants must rest upon the express terms of the statute, they have
no natural spring." In Kenan v. Bowers, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d)
112, 113, where additional compensation paid trustees by the beneficiary
of a trust was excluded as a deduction from the beneficiary's gross income
since there was no statutory provision therefor and that it was "only by
way of legislative favor that any taxpayer has the benefit of any deductions."
In Robinson Davis Lumber Co. v. Crooks, (W.D. Mo. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 638,
a deduction for a bad debt was disallowed because the taxpayer failed to
comply with the statute. "There must be strict compliance with . . . statute
if relief is to be had under it." In Otto Keusch, (1931) 23 B. T. A. 216,
219, 220, the board said that "All the revenue acts have authorized cer-
tain deductions in computing taxable net income, but have eliminated the
deductions which may be taken by individuals with respect to losses sus-
tained by them. Taxable net income is, therefore, a statutory concept and
under none of the acts is it in excess of the income upon which the Six-
teenth Amendment authorizes Congress to impose and collect a tax."207Darby-Lynde Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1931) 51 F.(2d) 32 (discovery value denied transferee) ; Phoenix Oil Production Co.
v. Commissioner, (1932) 25 B. T. A. 1239 (discovery value eliminated
from statute).
2-SHelvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 371,
54 Sup. Ct. 758, 78 L. Ed. 1311 (conditional deduction for depreciation);
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This tendency on the part of the lower federal courts to
expand the language of.-the Supreme Court to include all deduc-
tions is further illustrated by Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose. 09
In that case the commissioner had refused to permit the deduc-
tion of a loss of a subsidiary company, suffered before affiliation,
from the consolidated return of the operating unit. The Court, in
sustaining the action of the commissioner, said:
"A taxpayer who seeks an allowance for losses suffered in
an earlier year, must be able to point to a specific provision of
the statute permitting the deduction, and must bring himself
within its terms. Unless he can do this, the operations of the cur-
rent year must be the measure of his burden.1
210
Winmill v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 494 (taxpayer
denied right to deduct security losses from joint security profits) ; Balti-
more & Ohio R. Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th 'Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d)
456 (disallowance of bond expense previously deducted) ; Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 460
(nominal discount on stock disallowed); Brandon Corporation v. Com-
missioner (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 762 (new corporation denied
right to deduct loss of predecessor suffered during same year) ; New
World Life Ins. Co. v. United States, (1939) 89 Ct. Cl. 558, 26 F. Supp.
444 (allocation of general expense); Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Iron
Co. v. United States, (1936) 83 Ct. Cl. 712, 14 F. Supp. 918 (allowed de-
pletion less than actual depletion); Thomason v. Commissioner, (1935)
33 B. T. A. 576 (deduction of accrued interest denied taxpayer on cash
basis); Glide v. Commissioner, (1933) 27 B. T. A. 1264 (bonus payment
not subject to statutory depletion when wells not brought into operation).
209(1932) 286 U. S. 319, 52 Sup. Ct. 568, 76 L. Ed. 1128.
210(1932) 286 U. S. 319, 326, 52 Sup. Ct. 568, 569, 76 L. Ed. 1128.
Other federal cases decided during 1932 showed something of the same
reluctance illustrated in the Woolford decision to make sweeping generaliza-
tions. Martin v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 942, 944;
Palmer v. Bender, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 32, 33-34; Phoenix
Oil Production Co. v. Commissioner, (1932) 25 B. T. A. 1239, 1241. How-
ever, this was by no means true of the majority of the decisions handed
down during that year. In Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, (D. Kan.
1932) 1 F. Supp. 464, 467, a district court suggested that "Owners of
oil, gas, and mining properties are not entitled as a matter of right to
deduct anything from the receipts of the operations of such properties. The
entire receipts from the operations of mines and oil and gas wells are in-
comes and are taxable in their entirety." The court of claims during the
same year remarked that "it is for Congress to say, within reasonable
limits at least, how the tax shall be measured and what deductions should
be made in computing the tax on the income, or, in its wisdom and discre-
tion, it may refuse to allow any." The court then continued: "We do not
think that the constitutional amendment required Congress to impose a
tax on net income in a technical sense, for, if it did, the income tax would
be almost impossible to administer in many if not in most cases." Hccht v.
United States, (1932) 77 Ct. Cl. 225, 54 F. (2d) 968, 973, cert. denied,
(1932) 286 U. S. 560, 52 Sup. Ct. 648, 76 L. Ed. 1293. And in Lloyd v.
Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 842, 844, a taxpayer
was denied the right to deduct the expense incurred in the prosecution of a
successful action for slander since he was said to have "no right to any
deductions from his gross income unless such deductions are provided for
by the Revenue Statute." See also, White v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th
Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 726, 728; Lloyd v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
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Although the above statement obviously referred only to the
deduction of past losses,21-1 it was later cited in seven cases -12 in
connection with the power of Congress over deductions and only
one of them21 3 limited the language of the Court to the deduction
actually under consideration in the Woolford Case. The remain-
ing six cases cited it for the broad rule that the only deductions
allowable are those specifically authorized by statute.
As late as 1934 the Supreme Court followed its earlier prac-
tice, and carefully limited its remarks concerning the power of
Congress over deductions to the specific cases before it for deci-
sion.214 However, during that year the Court for the first time
accepted the unconditional statements which had been made with
increasing frequency by the lower federal courts. In Helaering v.
Independent Life Insurance Co.,21 5 the Court had underconsidera-
tion the provision in the Act of 1921 which denied life insurance
companies the right to deduct depreciation on the premises oc-
cupied by it unless the rental value, measured by four per cent of
the book value of the building occupied, was included in the com-
pany's gross income. In sustaining the conditional deduction the
Court found occasion to remark
1932) 55 F. (2d) 842; Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, (C.C.A. 10th
Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 309; Houston Production Co. v. United States,
(S.D. Tex. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 715; Glide v. Commissioner, (1933) 27
B. T. A. 1264; Comar Oil Co. v. Burnet (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1933) 64 F.
(2d) 965. Cf. Lindley v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d)
807; Squier v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 68 F. (2d) 25: New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933), 66 F. (2d) 480.
-1In Jankowsky v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1932) 56 F. (2d)
1006, 1008, it was said of past losses that "It is a mere truism to say that
petitioner in maling up his income tax return . . . was entitled to enter
such deductions only as were at that time authorized by law."212Merchants' Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1936)
84 F. (2d) 478; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 460; Empire Trust Company v. Commissioner,(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 307, 310; Brandon Corporation v. Com-
missioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 762; Barbour Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 163; Martin v. Com-
missioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 942, cert. denied, (1933)
289 U. S. 737, 53 Sup. Ct. 656; S. E. Thomason, (1935) 33 B. T. A. 576.
213Martin v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 942,
cert. denied, (1933) 289 U. S. 737, 53 Sup. Ct. 656 (taxpayer denied right
to prorate loss on installment sale).
24In Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hermandez, (1932) 292 U. S. 62, 66, 54
Sup. Ct. 596, 598, 78 L. Ed. 1127, the Court limited its language to the case
at hand. The corporate taxpayer claimed a deduction for loss sustained in
the sale of its subsidiary's assets. In sustaining the rejection of the tax.
payer's claim, the Court said that the deduction claimed was not allowable
"in the absence of a provision in the Act or regulations that fairly may
be read to authorize it."
215(1934) 292 U. S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 758, 78 L. Ed. 1311.
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"Unquestionably Congress has power to condition, limit, or
deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net
that it chooses to tax. ' '21
In support of this sweeping statement the Court cited three
cases: Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co.,2 1 7 Stanton v. Baltic
Minilg Co. 218 and Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co.2 1 1 The
first, as has been noted, referred only to deductions for depletion.
The second also related to depletion but, like the third, which
considered a broadside objection to the Act of 1913, based its
decision largely on the excise character of the income tax.
Although the Independent Life Insurance Co. Case as well as
the cases cited related to the taxation of corporations, the lan-
guage used by the Court was not so limited. Therefore it was
not to be expected that the remarks contained in the cases fol-
lowing th6 decision would be restricted either to the situations
falling within the scope of the Act of 1909 or to the particular
deductions before the court for decision.2 20
One week after the Independent Life Insurance Co. Case the
Supreme Court decided its most frequently cited decision on the
subject of the power of Congress over deductions. In New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering,221 the Court said:
"The power to tax income like that of the'new corporation
is plain and extends to the gross income. Whether and to what
extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace;
and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular
deduction be allowed. 2
Since the case involved the right to deduct the past losses of
another corporation, it presented no constitutional problem-and
this had been recognized by the court below.223 Yet more than
forty cases have been found which cite the New Colonial decision
210(1934) 292 U. S. 371, 381, 54 Sup. Ct. 758, 760, 78 L. Ed. 1311.
217(1931) 283 U. S. 301, 51 Sup. Ct. 418, 75 L. Ed. 1049.
218(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 60 L. Ed. 546.
219(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493.
2 2 0Helvering v. Winmill, (1938) 305 U. S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 45, 83 L.
Ed. 52; Winmill v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 494,
495; Weber Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1936)
82 F. (2d) 764; McGinley Corporation v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1936) 82 F. (2d) 56, 57; Merchants' Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 478, 481; Avery v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th
Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 905, 907; Commodore Mining Co. v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 131. 133; J. E. Riley Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 655, 658.
221(1934) 292 U. S. 435, 54 Sup. Ct. 788, 78 L. Ed. 1348.
222(1934) 292 U. S. 435, 440, 54 Sup. Ct. 788, 790, 78 L. Ed. 1348.
223(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 480.
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as authority for the principle that every deduction is purely
statutory or is a matter of legislative grace. 221
Until 1934 all of the Supreme Court and a majority of the
lower court decisions carefully limited their statements concern-
ing deductions to the facts of the case presented for decision. Per-
haps it was recognized that the various deductions contained in
one section lacked homogeneity. To say that Congress could deny
the deduction of a charitable contribution was quite a different
thing from saying that Congress could deny the deduction of
expenses necessarily incurred in securing gross income or that
current business losses could not be deducted from operating
profits. The deductions enumerated in the act presented some-
what distinct constitutional problems.2 2 5 For example, the deduc-
224Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Magruder, (D. Aid. 1940) 34 F. Supp.
199, 203; Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 4th Cir. 1938) 94
F. (2d) 307, 310; Commodore Mining Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th
Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 131, 133; Cooperative Oil Ass'n v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1941) 115 F. (2d) 666, 668, 669; Deputy v. Du Pont,
(1940) 308 U. S. 488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 431; White v. United
States, (1938) 305 U. S. 281, 59 Sup. Ct. 179, 83 L. Ed. 172; Hclvering v.
Inter-Mountain Life Insurance Co., (1935) 294 U. S. 686, 55 Sup. Ct. 572,
79 L. Ed. 1227; United States v. Donaldson Realty Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1939) 106 F. (2d) 509; Scripps v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1938)
96 F. (2d) 492; cert. denied, (1938) 305 U. S. 625, 59 Sup. Ct. 86, 83 L.
Ed. 400; Bagnall v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d)
956; Helvering v. Obici, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 431, af'd
(1939) 305 U. S. 468, 59 Sup. Ct. 260, 83 L. Ed. 292; Walsh-McGuire
Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 983; Commis-
sioner v. Trustees of Lumber Inv. Ass'n, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 100 F.
(2d) 18; Walker v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d)
297; Sabath v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 569;
Avery v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 905; Mer-
chants' Bank Bldg. v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 478;
McGinley Corporation v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. (1936) 82 F.
(2d) 56; Weber Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1936)
82 F. (2d) 764; Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1936) 80 F. (2d) 872; Shapleigh Hardvare Co. v. United States,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 697; Remco S. S. Co. v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 988, cert. den. (1936) 299 U. S. 555, 57
Sup. Ct. 17; Pennsylvania Company for Insurances, v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 719; Surety Finance Co. v. Commis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 221; Langford Investment Co. v.
Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 468; Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 456; Balti-
more & Ohio R. Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d)
460; O'Laughlin v. Helvering, (1935) 65 App. D. C. 135, 81 F. (2d) 269;
Barbour Coal Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d)
163, cert. den. (1935) 295 U. S. 731, 55 Sup. Ct. 643; Edward 3. White,
(1938) 37 B. T. A. 1106; Robert P. Scripps, (1936) 33 B. T. A. 962;
Frederick H. Wood, (1936) 34 B. T. A. 1252; Helen H. Heiibroner,
(1936) 34 B. T. A. 1200; Word Specialty Manufacturing Co., (1936) 34
B. T. A. 974; American Arch Co., (1935) 33 B. T. A. 705; S. E. Thomason,
(1935) 33 B. T. A. 576; Paul Pryibil, (1934) 31 B. T. A. 164.
2 2 5See Davis v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 323.
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tion of losses presented the problem of the power of Congress
to tax profitable years and transactions and to ignore unprofitable
ones; the deduction of expense raised the question of whether
Congress could tax the return of capital; while the deduction for
charitable contributions related to the problem of classification-
the extent to which Congress may grant exemptions from taxa-
tion and the power to classify gifts, permitting the deduction
of some and denying the deduction of others.
However, with the Independent Life Insurance Co. and New
Colonial Ice Co. opinions, there was a decided shift in judicial
sentiment. The cases decided thereafter were, with only a few
exceptions, unlimited in their scope.220 The power of Congress
over deductions was absolute. 27
2 2
6Of the eighty cases following Helvering v. Independent Life
Ins. Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 758, 78 L. Ed. 1311, and New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, (1934) 292 U. S. 435, 54 Sup. Ct. 788, 78
L. Ed. 1311, sixty-nine speak of the power of Congress over deductions
as being unlimited. See cases cited supra, note 224. See also First National
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941) 115 F. (2d)
194, 195 (limited deduction for loss); Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Coln-
missioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 882, 887 (charitable con-
tribution) ; Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, (D. Mass. 1940)
35 F. Supp. 523, 525; J. E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th
Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 655, 658 (depletion controversy) ; Manufacturers
Trust Co. v. United States, (1940) 92 Ct. Cl. 622, 32 F. Supp. 289, 296
(losses not off-set against gains under Silver Purchase Act of 1934);
Markwell's Estate v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d)
253, 255 (estate tax decision) ; United States v. Sentinel Oil Co., (C.C.A.
9th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 854; Jones v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1939) 103 F. (2d) 681; United States v. 0. J. Morrison Stores, (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 77; Dexter v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 1st Cir.
1938) 99 F. (2d) 769; Winmill v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1937) 93
F. (2d) 494; Crowley v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d)
715; Cleveland Shopping News Co. v. Routzahn, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937)
89 F. (2d) 902; Bermont Oil Co. v. Helvering, (1937) 67 App. D. C.
256, 91 F. (2d) 710; Johnston v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1936)
86 F. (2d) 732, cert. den. (1937) 301 U. S. 683, 57 Sup. Ct. 784; Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1936) 87 F. (2d)
131; Brandon Corporation v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1934) 71 F.
(2d) 762; Craik v. United States, (1940) 90 Ct. Cl. 345, 31 F. Supp.
132; New World Life Ins. Co. v. United States, (1939) 89 Ct. Cl. 558,
26 F. Supp. 444; Pleasants v. United States, (1938) 86 Ct. Cl. 754, 22 F.
Supp. 964; Chisolm v. United States, (1937) 85 Ct. Cl. 701, 19 F. Supp.
274; Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, (1936) 83
Ct. Cl. 712, 14 F. Supp. 918; Faber v. United States, (1935) 81 Ct. Cl.
980, 10 F. Supp. 602; Du Pont v. Commissioner, (1938) 37 B. T. A. 1198;
William F. Humphrey, (1935) 33 B. T. A. 442. Only eleven purported
to state a rule limited to the deduction under consideration. Anderson v.
Helvering (1940) 310 U. S. 404, 60 Sup. Ct. 952, 84 L. Ed. 1277 (de-
duction for depletion and depreciation said to be an act of grace) ; e-Id-
vering v. Mountain Producers Corporation, (1938) 303 U. S. 376, 58 Sup.
Ct. 623, 82 L. Ed. 907 (depletion deduction an act of grace) ; Helvering v.
Bankline Oil Co., (1938) 303 U. S. 362, 58 Sup. Ct. 616, 82 L. Ed. 897(deduction for depletion an act of grace) ; Miller v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
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But the statement that the power of Congress over deduc-
tions is absolute does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the Supreme Court will sanction a tax on gross receipts. The
present act impliedly excludes total receipts from the taxpayer's
return.22 Only those receipts containing some element of profit
need be reported and then only after deducting the "cost of
goods sold." 229 Congress has been exceedingly generous in pro-
viding for exemptions, credits and deductions, so that authority
on the question of the power of Congress to tax gross receipts is
difficult to find. There appears to be no immediate prospect that
a gross receipts tax in the guise of an income tax will be levied.
However, if the attempt should be made the Supreme Court will
be compelled to choose between the explicit concept of taxable
income in Eisner v. Macomber230 and the implicit concept found
in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.2 31 -and Supreme Court decisions
are to be found which indicate that the latter concept may be
accepted when the question is squarely presented to the Court.
In Deputy v. Dupont,2 3 2 the taxpayer borrowed stock from
a corporation under an agreement whereby he was required to
9th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 479, 480 (net loss carryover); Lucky Tiger-
Combination Gold Mining Co. v. Crooks, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1938) 95 F.(2d) 885 (depletion deduction a matter of grace) ; Davis v. United States,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 323 (two types of deductions, only one
a matter of congressional grace) ; Van Vleck v. Commissioner, (C. C. A.
2d Cir 1935) 80 F. (2d) 217 (deduction of past losses depends upon legis-
lative grace); Commissioner v. Riggs, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d)
1004; Champlin v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 905(allowance for depletion a matter of grace); Courier Journal Job Print-
ing Co. v. Glenn, (W.D. Ky. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 55, 58 (loss properly
deducted) ; Hurley v. United States (N.D. Okla., 1935) 10 F. Supp. 365
(allowance for depletion a matter of grace).227
"Every deduction from gross income is allowed as a matter of
legislative grace." White v. United States, (1938) 305 U. S. 281, 292, 59
Sup. Ct. 179, 184, 83 L. Ed. 172. Deputy v. Du Pont, (1940) 308 U. S.
488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 416, and Helvering v. Winmill, (1938)
305 U. S. 79, 84, 59 Sup. Ct. 45, 47, 83 L. Ed. 52. Cf. Davis v. United
States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 323, 324-325; Holmes, Federal
Taxes (6th ed. 1925) 506.
228" 'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from
salaries, wages or compensation for personal service . . . or from profes-
sions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in
property . . . also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the
transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatever...." Revenue
Act of 1939, sec. 22(a).
229Prentice-Hall 1940 Federal Tax Service Par. 17,004.
230(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521.
233(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 60 L. Ed. 546.
232(1940) 308 U. S. 488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 416.
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return the stock in kind at the end of a stated number of years
and "in the interim to pay to the lender all dividends declared and
paid on the shares so loaned." Although the Supreme Court
agreed that "he was little more than a conduit," the statute did
not provide for a deduction of this character and the dividends re-
ceived (and included in gross income) could not be deducted
even though paid to the lender in accordance with the require-
ments of an admittedly valid agreement.
"Allowance of deductions from gross income does not turn on
general equitable considerations. It 'depends upon legislative
grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any par-
ticular deduction be allowed.' New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v.
Helvering."211
Since the taxpayer paid over the dividends in the year actually
received and was required to report these dividends in his tax-
able income, 3 4 a clearer case of taxing gross receipts cannot be
imagined."' Although the government suggested that the pay-
ments were capital in nature,23 6 Mr. Justice Roberts in his
dissent remarked that the carrying charge was either a business
expense "or it was nothing of consequence under any provision
of the statute." 237
An earlier case, Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,23 8 furnishes
an additional illustration of the use of the income tax to tax gross
receipts. From 1913 to 1916 the taxpayer was engaged in dredging
the Delaware River for the federal government. Because of a
breach of warranty of the character of the materials to be dredged,
actual expenses exceeded the payments received from the United
States by $176,271.88. Suit was brought and judgment recovered
238(1940) 308 U. S. 488, 493, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 366, 84 L. Ed. 416.
23 4See Pierre S. Du Pont, (1938) 37 B. T. A. 1198, 1272, 1278 whichinvolved a different tax year, but the Board said that the facts were
identical with Du Pont v. Deputy, (1940) 22 F. Supp. 589, aff'd 308 U. S.
488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 416.2
3
51n Brown v. Helvering, (1934) 291 U. S. 193, 54 Sup. Ct. 356, 78
L. Ed. 725, a general agent for an insurance company was required to pay
an income tax on the full amount of commissions received during the
year even though it was recognized that a part of the commissions would
have to be returned to the insurance company because of the cancellation of
policies. See also, North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnett, (1932) 286
U. S. 417, 424, 52 Sup. Ct. 613, 615, 76 L. Ed. 1197, where it was said:
"If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without re-
striction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required
to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to re-
tain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore
its equivalent."
236(1940) 308 U. S. 488, 499, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 369, 84 L. Ed. 416.
237(1940) 308 U. S. 488, 502, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 370, 84 L. Ed. 416.
238(1931) 282 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 75 L. Ed. 383.
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in 1920. When the taxpayer failed to include the judgment in his
gross income for the year the commissioner made a deficiency
assessment for this amount. Although the judgment clearly repre-
sented a mere return of the expenditures, the Supreme Court
brushed aside the objection that the tax was not laid on income
(and therefore void because not apportioned) by the simple expe-
dient of calling the receipts income. 239 The Court knew that the
receipts were income because Congress had clearly expressed an
intention to include such payments in the taxpayer's return. 2 0
That the Court should rely upon 'the intention of Congress is not
surprising, since it is doubtful that the most optimistic and in-
accurate layman would consider the reimbursement of past ex-
penses "profits."
In Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 2  the taxpayer
sold goods on credit and the -debtor shortly thereafter became
bankrupt. Although there could be no doubt that a large part of
the debt would be lost, the taxpayer was required to include the
full amount in its gross income. Since the company was permitted
to deduct the expenses connected with the sale from gross income,
there was no question as to the taxation of gross receipts. But
unless the net profit from the transaction amounted to more than
72Y2 per cent of the selling price, there was no profit to be
taxed.2"2 The difference between the amount of profit and the
72Y2 per cent clearly represented a loss to the company. But even
if the net profit amounted to more than 72Y2 per cent of the sell-
ing price the taxpayer was not taxed on this basis; it was taxed
on the lost profits as well,--an amount much larger than any pos-
sible actual net return. To justify the decision on the ground that
the loss could be deducted from gross income during the year in
which its amount was finally ascertained requires the acceptance
of the theory that Congress may tax during the current year
hypothetical profits which may or may not be realized in the year
in which the loss is determined. And to point out that a different
result could have been obtained by reporting income on a cash
239"If respondents contention that only gain or profit may be taxed
under the sixteenth amendment be accepted without qualification, the ques-
tion remains whether the gain or profit which is the subject of the tax
may be ascertained, as here, on the basis of fixed accounting periods...
282 U. S. 359, 362, 363, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 151, 75 L. Ed. 383.
240282 U. S. 359, 363, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 151, 75 L. Ed., 383.
241(1934) 292 U. S. 182, 54 Sup. Ct. 644, 78 L. Ed. 1200.
242The taxpayer later received dividends totalling 27y %. 292 U. S.
182, 183, 54 Sup. Ct. 644, 78 L. Ed. 1200.
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receipts basis fails to meet the constitutional issue in question.
Unless it is assumed that Congress could not require the use
of an accrual basis, and unless it is further assumed that the
Supreme Court did not actually mean that deductions are a
matter of congressional grace, it/must follow that Congress has
the power to tax as income a profitless transaction.
An even clearer example of a transactions "income" tax is
found in Helvering v. Midland Mittual Life Insurance Co.2 4 0
In that case the taxpayer foreclosed mortgages on real estate
given to secure loans which wete in default. The company was
the only bidder and in each case the amount of the bid included
both the principal and accrued interest. Since the property re-
ceived in return for the defaulted loan was less than the capital
originally expended by the company, it was argued that under the
rule of Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.24 4 there could be no taxable
income from the foreclosure. This contention was rejected by
Mr. Justice Brandeis on the ground that Congress intended to in-
clude as income the "interest" credited to the taxpayer as part of
the purchase price of the property bid in at the foreclosure sale.
The transaction was treated as if the property had been pur-
243(1937) 300 U. S. 216, 57 Sup. Ct. 423, 81 L. Ed. 612.
244 (1918) 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L. Ed. 1054; supra, pp. 425-6.
It seems strange that a case decided solely on a basis of statutory construc-
tion should be so frequently cited for the proposition that Congress has
no constitutional power to tax the conversion of assets. That the Court
was merely interpreting the intention of Congress appears at frequent in-
tervals in the decision. For example, it was said that "legislative purpose
was not to tax property as such, or the mere conversion of property."
247 U. S. 179, 183, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L. Ed. 1054, and "By the true intent
and meaning of the act the entire proceeds of a mere conversion of capital
assets were not to be treated as income." 247 U. S. 184. The Treasury
Regulations provided that "the cutting from timber lands ... [were to be]
considered simply a change in the form of assets" and the Court agreed
with the taxpayer that this was a proper interpretation of the statute. An
earlier case, Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, (1913) 231 U. S.
399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L. Ed. 285, had rejected the contention that
Congress had no power to tax the conversion of assets. Although the
Doyle Case permitted the deduction of the value of the stumpage cut dur-
ing the year while the Howbert Case denied the deduction of depletion,
the accuracy with which standing timber could be valued as compared with
the difficulty of valuing sub-surface minerals may have justified the con-
clusion that Congress intended "to permit the deduction of capital in the
case where it was readily ascertained and did not intend to deduct the
return of capital in the case where the value was highly conjectural."
Congress evidently intended to adopt a measure of the tax that should be
easy of ascertainment and simply and readily applied in practice, (1913)
231 U. S. 399, 417, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L. Ed. 285. Von Baumbach v.
Sargent Land Co., (1917) 242 U. S. 503, 37 Sup. Ct. 201, 61 L. Ed. 460;
United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., (1918) 247 U. S. 116, 38 Sup. Ct.
462, 62 L. Ed. 1017; Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Scott, (1918)
247 U. S. 126, 38 Sup. Ct. 465, 62 L. Ed. 1022.
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chased by a stranger and the proceeds turned over to the com-
pany in full payment-of principal and interest. 4 s The constitu-
tional approach was rejected and the controversy limited to a
matter of statutory interpretation. From a reading of this decision
it would appear that the question was no longer one of whether
Congress had the power to tax as income that which was not in-
come, but was whether Congress intended to tax as income that
which was not income.
"Where the legal effect of a transaction fits the plain letter
of -the statute, the tax is held payable, unless there is clearly re-
vealed in the act itself or in its history a definite intention to ex-
lude such transaction from the operation of its applicable lan-
guage. 248
In the four cases just mentioned it is apparent that the Court
permitted the taxation of something other than income by an
"income tax." In the Dupont Case the tax was laid upon a proft-
less receipt and delivery of dividends; in Sanford & Brooks Co.
the tax was laid upon the restoration of capital; in Spring City
Foundry Co. the taxpayer was compelled to pay a tax on a profit-
less sale; while in Midland Mutul Life Isurance Co. the com-
pany was required to pay a tax on interest which it had never re-
ceived. 247 Although these cases violate all conventions of account-
ing and in 'no way conform to the orthodox concepts of income,
it is clear that Congress was merely taxing events which could
have been reached by an excise tax; and if the income tax may
be considered as being one form of an excise "-4 there can be no
constitutional objections to these decisions. 49
2 4 5The "same as if' argument made in connection with stock dividends
was rejected by the Court in Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189,
40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed.'521. "It is said there is no difference between
a simple stock dividend and a case where stockholders use money re-
ceived as cash dividends to purchase additional stock contemporaneously
issued by the corporation. But an actual cash dividend, with a real option
to the stockholder either to keep the money for his own or to reinvest it
in new shares, would be as far removed as possible from a true stock
dividend, such as the one we have under consideration, where nothing of
value is taken from the company's assets and transferred to the individual
ownership of the several stockholders and thereby subject to their dis-
posal." 252 U. S. 189, 215. See dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., 252
U. S. 189, 227, 228.
246(1937) 300 U. S. 216, 224, 57 Sup. Ct 423, 426, 81 L. Ed. 612.247In this connection see Dohr, Income Divorced From Reality, (1938)
66 Journal of Accountancy 361.
24 8For statements to the effect that an income tax is an excise, or in-
direct tax, see Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 329; Rottschaefer, Constitu-
tional Law (1939) 190.
249That Congress may tax the gross receipts of a business was settled
by Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, (1904) 192 U. S. 397, 24
Sup. Ct. 376, 48 L. Ed. 496. See supra, note 131.
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The Baltic Mining Co. 2 50 and Tyee Realty Co. 2 5 1 Cases re-
turned the income tax to the category to which it "inherently be-
longed" and, with the exception of Eisner v. Macomber,2" there
have been no subsequent cases which have necessarily changed
this classification ;21' and even Eisner v. Macomber has given way
to economic imperatives. The dividend cases immediately following
the Macomber decision refused to accept its mandate to look to
the substance of the tax. Dividends which gave the stockholder a
slightly different legal interest in a corporation, were taxed as in-
come, 25" but the measure of that tax was not the value of the new
interest; the measure was the market value of the share of stock
received from the corporation.2 55 Thus the income tax cases recog-
nized the outstanding characteristic of an excise,-the distinction
between the subject and the measure of a tax.250 This recognition,
2150(1916) 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 60 L. Ed. 546.
251(1916) 240 U. S. 115, 36 Sup. Ct. 281, 60 L. Ed. 554.
252(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521. "Viewed
against the cases that succeeded it, Eisner v. Macomber loses greatly in
magnitude. Restricted on all sides to its facts, its bold definition of income
partly discarded in result and subsequently regarded as a futile attempt to
confine a term that must remain elastic." Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 67.
235 Even Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co., (1925) 268 U. S. 628, 45 Sup.
Ct. 614, 69 L. Ed. 1124, may be considered as a case which turned on an
interpretation of a statute rather than on the interpretation of the con-
stitution.
"54See the cases on corporate reorganization: United States v. Phellis,
(1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63, 66 L. Ed. 180; Rockfeller v. United
States, (1921) 257 U. S. 176, 42 Sup. Ct. 68, 66 L. Ed. 186; Cullinan v.
Walker, (1923) 262 U. S. 134, 43 Sup. Ct. 495, 67 L. Ed. 906; Marr v.
United States, (1925) 268 U. S. 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 575, 60 L. Ed. 1079.
Dividends in property: Peabody v. Eisner, (1918) 247 U. S. 347, 38 Sup,
Ct. 546, 62 L. Ed. 1152.255In Towne v. Eisner, (1918) 245 U. S. 418, 426, 38 Sup. Ct. 158,
159, 62 L. Ed. 392, where the Court held that stock dividends did not
constitute income within the meaning of the 1909 Act, this difference was
recognized by Mr. Justice Holmes, who observed that: "If the plaintiff
gained any small advantage by the change, it certainly was not an advan-
tage of $417,450, the sum upon which he was taxed." Powell, Income from
Corporate Dividends, (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 363.250The same comment also applies to cash dividends received by a
stockholder who purchased shares at a price which reflected the undistri-
buted earnings of the corporation. Mr. Justice Pitney, in United States v.
Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 171, 42 Sup. Ct. 63, 66, 66 L. Ed. 180,
recognized this contention when he said that: "the possibility of occasional
instances of apparent hardship in the incidence of the tax may be conceded.
Where, as in this case, the dividend constitutes a distribution of profits
accumulated during an extended period and bears a large proportion to
the par value of the stock, if an investor happened to buy stock shortly be-
fore the dividend, paying a price enhanced by an estimate of the capital
plus the surplus of the company, and after distribution of the surplus, with
corresponding reduction in the intrinsic and market value of the shares,
he was called upon to pay a tax upon the dividend received, it might look
in this case like a tax upon his capital." However, this objecton was
avoided on the ground that "uresumably the prospect of a dividend in-
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coupled with the fact that Congress may tax as income that
which is not income, necessarily conflicts with the premise upon
which the Macomber Case was based, namely, that in order to
give the apportionment clause "proper force and effect . . . it
becomes essential t6 distinguish between what is and what is not
'income'.. . and to apply the distinction . . . hccording to truth
and substance, without regard to forin."2 57 Furthermore, a recent
case has intimated that a shareholder may be subject to an income
tax even though he does not receive a new interest in the corpora-
tion.2ms Collector v. Hubbard2 5 which had previously adopted this
view, was expressly disapproved by Eisner z. Macomber. A re-
vival of the earlier principle would make the position of the
five justices who decided the later case untenable. -0
CONCLUSION
At best the determination of annual income "is the result of
good guessing."26' So much of it is based on estimates that the
result can only be approximate.20 2 Perhaps no two accountants
would reach the same result if given the same basic materials.21-
Yet in spite of its inaccuracy the estimates are so important that
even greater errors are accepted in order to obtain increasingly
frequent samplings of the current fortunes of an enterprise.2" '
fluenced the price paid, and was discounted by the prospect of an income
tax to be paid thereon,"-a presumption which may be difficult actually to
demonstrate in practice.
257(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 206, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193, 64 L. Ed. 521.
2581n Helvering v. National Grocery Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 282 288, 58
Sup. Ct. 932, 935, 82 L. Ed. 1346, Mr. Justice Brandeis said that "the sole
owner of the business could not by conducting it as a corporation pre-
vent Congress, if it choose to do so, from laying on him individually the
tax upon the year's profits.'
259(1871) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 1, 20 L. Ed. 272. The 1864 act required the
taxpayer to report his share of the corporate earnings as a part of his
individual income even though such income had not been distributed. The
Court sustained the provision.2GOThe taxation of undistributed profits on the basis of a stock dividend
would not appear to be an unreasonable classification.26011ontgomery, Accounting and the Concept of Income in Magill,
Lectures on Taxation (1932) 42, 43.
262" ¥e like to think of income as something reasonably possible to
determine with accuracy, but the moment Nye deal with the major elements
which form the bases of the determination, we find that estimates and
opinions rather than facts and figures comprise the largest percentage
of the factors which must be used to arrive at any result at all." Mont-
gomery, Accounting and the Concept of Income in Magill, Lectures on
Taxation (1932) 40.
2631 National Industrial Conference Board, The Shifting and Effects
of the Federal Corporation Income Tax (1928) 35.264 See Paton and Littleton, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting
Standards 22.
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If all business were begun and concluded within a short period
of time the computation of income would be easier and far more
accurate than that actually experienced in ordinary business. It is
a relatively simple matter to determine the amount of capital at
the beginning and at the end of an enterprise, add to the increase
or subtract from the decrease any payments made to the owners
and determine the net profit or loss. Unfortunately, the needs of
government cannot wait upon the conclusion of a business which
may extend over a period of years. It thus becomes necessary for
tax purposes to estimate the income of an individual or of a
corporation at relatively frequent intervals. It is known in advance
that activities of any size and variation will necessarily entail
rough approximations, arbitrary allocations and frequent errors.
But if income is to be computed on an annual basis such defects
and injustices are inevitable.
When income is estimated for the information of management,
owners, and existing and potential creditors these inaccuracies are
accepted as a matter of course. Their inevitable presence is appre-
ciated and those using the information make whatever corrections
they think the circumstances require. There is no immediate and
readily perceivable out-of-pocket loss as the result of the use of
estimates and rules of thumb. But when it comes to income taxa-
tion, entirely different considerations apply.2 5 The fundamental
conservatism of the accountant works very well when income
statements are prepared for credit purposes, but it is in direct
conflict with the necessities of the tax collector.2 0 Management
is content with arbitrary estimates and rigid accounting rules
when the reports are compiled for informative purposes, but when
the application of such techniques is the direct cause of the pay-
265Gilman, Accounting Concepts of Profit (1939) iv, 17; Wuller, Con-
cepts of Taxable Income II: The American Contribution, (1938) 35 Pol.
Sci. Q. 557, 580.
266"His methods appear to be founded upon profound mistrust of both
his professional colleagues and his employers. The reputable accountant
never loses sight of the fact that his income statements are influential in
matters of dividend policy. Income, for him, is perhaps only what may be
reported safely to unsophisticated directors as income. He aims, it would
seem, never to ascertain what income is, in any really definable sense, but
rather to devise rules of calculation which will make the result a minimum
or at least give large answers only in the future. Conventional accounting,
moreover, not only employs a procedure with a markedly conservative bias
but promptly repudiates this procedure whenever it shows signs of working
the other way. When prices drawn from actual transactions on his books
affords excessive estimates, the accountant promptly appeals to the market
for his valuations." Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938) 81.
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ment of large sums of money in taxes there is strong objection to
their use. Nevertheless, if an income tax is to be collected arbi-
trary rules must be established in order to determine the amount
subject to the tax.267
That Congress may tax income on an annual basis is too well
settled to be questioned. As was said in Burnet v. Sanford &
Brooks Co., 268
"The computation of income annually as the net result of all
transactions within the year was a familiar practice, and taxes
upon income so arrived at were not unknown, before the six-
teenth amendment. . . . While, conceivably, a different system
might be devised by which the tax could be assessed, wholly or
in part, on the basis of the finally ascertained results of the par-
ticular transactions, Congress is not required by the amendment
to adopt such a system in preference to the more familiar method,
even if it were practicable."
As a neceksary corollary to the power to tax on an annual
basis Congress may specify the time when an item of income is
to be included in the taxpayer's return and the time when a
deduction from income may be made. Whether income is to be
reported in the year earned, the year due, or the year actually
received, and whether expenses are to be deducted in the year in-
curred, in the year actually paid, or in the year in which the ex-
penditure results in profit are matters falling within the sphere
of proper regulation. All of these matters involve so many ques-
tions of judgment and differences of opinion that any regulation
enacted by Congress is not likely to be so violative of the "com-
monly understood meaning" of income as to raise a serious con-
stitutional question.
Additional control over the method of ascertaining income
for tax purposes is found in the power to provide reasonable
- regulations for the purpose of preventing tax avoidance and eva-
sion. Unless Congress has the power to prescribe objective tests
for the realization of income and loss and for the allocation of
expense it would be very easy for the taxpayer, during years of
" 267That such arbitrary rules are not entirely without justification
seems dear. "Books can be made to show almost any :ondition desired
to be shown, and reports can be drawn up in such a way that though they
do not portray the actual condition, they are not false." Gerstenberg, Finan-
cial Organization and Management (1932) 743, 744.
"So long as accounting standards are not hardened, and the law does not
impose any specific canons, directors and their accountants may frame their
figures, within limits, much as they choose!' Berle and Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property (1934) 203.
268(1931) 282 U. S. 359, 365, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 152, 75 L. Ed. 383.
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large profits, to "minimize" gains and to be unduly pessimistic
about losses and expense.
Congress, having the power to require an annual basis for re-
porting income, may limit the deductions to events which were
allocable to that period. Many income tax statutes have reflected
the belief that an annual basis of taxation is arbitrary and fails in
many instances to indicate properly the taxpayer's ability to pay.
Corrective measures in the form of provisions permitting the
carrying-forward of losses or permitting the averaging of several
years' results have frequently been made a part of income tax
legislation.269 But whatever reasons of fairness may be advanced
for such relief, no constitutional objection to the denial of a de-
duction for past losses is likely to be raised. To quote again from
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.s 270
"A taxpayer may be in receipt of net income in one year and
not in another. The net result of the two years, if considered in a
single taxable period, might still be a loss; but it never has been
supposed that that fact would relieve him from a tax on the
first, or that it affords any reason for postponing the assessment
of the tax until the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite
period, to ascertain more precisely whether the final outcome of
the period, or for a given transaction, will be a gain or a loss."
Although Congress may tax on an annual basis and may
ignore past losses, a more fundamental problem is involved in the
consideration of the meaning of annual income. Since the amend-
ment provides for the taxation of "incomes" without apportion-
ment, there is some basis for the contention that the constitution
expressly permits the taxation of the profits from the separate
activities of the taxpayer during the year in question. Conse-
quently, if Congress so provides, a person may be said to have
a taxable profit for the year even though his affairs were con-
ducted at a serious loss. Such may be the result of an income tax
assessed on profitable transactions without allowing a deduction
for losses from unprofitable activities. Yet it seems clear that
Congress may tax incomes on this basis. That Congress may tax
a single type of enterprise is definitely settled. 211 Furthermore,
Congress may limit losses during the year to gains from the
269See Altman, Net Losses and the Taxable Year, (1934) 28 I1. L. Rev.
525.
270(1931) 282 U. S. 359, 364. 365, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 152, 75 L. Ed. 383.
27lUnited States v. Hudson, (1937) 299 U. S. 498, 57 Sup. Ct. 309,
81 L. Ed. 370.
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same kind of activity.27 2 It is but a short step to the position that
Congress may deny the deduction of all losses. 2 a
That Congress may deny the deduction of expenses directly
allocable to the "income" subject to the tax was settled so far
as deductions for depletion and interest were concerned as early
as 1916. Starting from this premise, the Supreme Court, the lower
federal courts and the board of tax appeals have expanded the
principle so that it may be said to include all deductions from
gross income. At least the courts have said that Congress may
limit or deny deductions at will.
However, it may be argued that the courts have not actually
held that all deductions are a matter of congressional grace and
that the decisions containing statements to this effect may be
easily, reconciled with a net income concept of the sixteenth amend-
ment. It may be pointed out that in some of the cases the de-
cisions were in the taxpayer's favor and the deductions permit-
ted"73 while in others the remarks did not even remotely pertain
272Helvering v. Winmill, (1938) 305 U. S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 45, 83 L.
Ed. 52; Mente v. Eisner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1920) 266 Fed. 161; Coln v.
United States, (1938) 91 Ct. CI. 418, 23 F. Supp. 534. In Edward J.
White, (1938) 37 B. T. A. 1106, the taxpayer was engaged in the business
of buying and selling securities and commodities. During the year in ques-
tion, the taxpayer made large, profits trading in commodities, but his losses
from trading in stocks exceeded these profits. Section 23(r), Revenue Act
of 1932, permited the deduction of security losses only to the extent of the
profits from such transactions. Although it was argued that since there was
no income for the year any unapportioned tax would violate art. I, see. 9
of the constitution, the board rejected the contention and held the tax on
the commodity profits valid. See also Manufacturers Trust Co. v. United
States, (1940) 92 Ct. CI. 622, 32 F. Supp. 289, 296 where under the
Silver Purchase Act of 1934, the taxpayer was not permitted to deduct un-
profitable silver sales from profitable transactions.2
"- Manufacturers Trust Co. v. United States, (1940) 92 Ct. Cl. 622,
32 F. Supp. 289, cert. den. (1941) 312 U. S. 691, 61 Sup. Ct. 710.
-73Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1933) 66 F.
(2d) 309, s. c. (D. Kan. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 464 (basis for depletion to pur-
chaser held to be cost of stock and not cost of property to liquidated cor-
poration) ; Chisolm v. United States, (1937) 85 Ct. Cl. 701, 19 F. Supp. 274
(life beneficiary permitted to deduct depreciation from receipts from trust
fund where trustee not required to maintain corpus in undepreciated state) ;
Champlin v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 905 (de-
pletion allowance not to be reduced because of cloud on taxpayer's title) ;
Pleasants v. United States, (1938) 87 Ct. Cl. 751, 22 F. Supp. 964, s. c.
(1939) 305 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 282, 83 L. Ed. 217 (charitable contribution
limitation applies to net income without regard to capital net loss);
Houston Production Co. v. United States, (S.D. Tex. 1933) 4 F. Supp.
715 (inconsistent claim by taxpayer); Craik v. United States, (1940) 90
Ct Cl. 345, 31 F. Supp. 132 (that part of the partnership income from
sources without United States held not taxable to non-resident alien) ; Ken-
tucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, (W. D. Ky. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 723
(1913 value of contract may be deducted over life of contract as "obsoles-
cence"); Courier Journal Job Printing Co. v. Glenn, (W.D. Ky. 1941)
37 F. Supp. 55, 58 (loss properly deducted) ; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Magruder, (D; Md. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 199, 203 (loss properly deducted).
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to the question being decided.2 7 4 A great many of the cases in-
volved deductions for current27 5 or for past losses.210 Others
274Anderson v. Helvering, (1940) 310 U. S. 404, 60 Sup. Ct. 952, 84
L. Ed. 1277 (payments made for oil well included in gross income) Lang-
ford Investment Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d)
468 (compromise by trustee of a claim that the trust was a fraudulent
conveyance); Faber v. United States, (1935) 81 Ct. CI. 980, 10 F. Supp.
602, cert den. (1935) 296 U. S. 596, 56 Sup. Ct. 115, 80 L. Ed. 422 (deduc-
tion from gross estate of decedent) ; Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 307, 310 (estate tax decision); Mark-
well's Estate v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 253,
255 (estate tax decision).275White v. United States, (1938) 305 U. S. 281, 59 Sup. Ct. 179,
83 L. Ed. 172 (limitation of amount of deductible loss); Helvering v.
Chester N. Weaver Co., (1938) 305 U. S. 293, 59 Sup. Ct. 185, 83 L. Ed.
180 (limitation of amount of deductible loss) ; Neuberger v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 649 (personal losses not deductible from
partnership profits) ; Helvering v. Obici, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d)
431 aff'd (1939) 305 U. S. 468, 59 Sup. Ct. 260, 83 L. Ed. 202 (loss of
property not used in business) ; Manufacturers Trust Co. v. United States,
(1940) 92 Ct. Cl. 622, 32 F. Supp. 289, 296 (losses not set off against
gains under Silver Purchase Act of 1934) ; First National Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941) 115 F. (2d) 194, 195(limited deduction for loss); Winmill v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1937) 93 F. (2d) 494, rev'd on another issue, (1938) 305 U. S. 79, 59 Sup.
Ct. 45, 83 L. Ed. 52 (taxpayer denied right to deduct personal loss fromjoint profits); Davis v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d)
323 (limitation on deductible loss); Johnston v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 732, cert. den., (1937) 301 U. S. 683, 57 Sup. Ct.
784 (deduction of individual non-capital loss from share of partnership
profits from sale of non-capital assets) ; Avery v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 905 (limitation on deductible loss) ; Pennsyl-
vania Company for Insurances v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 75
F. (2d) 719 (new corporation denied deduction for losses suffered during
earlier part of year by its predecessor) ; Brandon Corporation v. Commis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 762 (new corporation may not
deduct losses suffered earlier in year by old corporation) ; White v. Com-
missioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 726 (partnership assumed
loss of member) ; Ludington v. McCaughn, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 1 F.(2d) 689, rev'd (1925) 268 U. S. 106, 45 Sup. Ct. 423; Cohn v. United
States, (1938) 91 Ct. Cl. 418, 23 F. Supp. 534 (loss from sale of securi-
ties deductible only to extent of profits from such transactions) ; Edward J.
White, (1938) 37 B. T. A. 1006 (security losses deductible only to extent
of such profits) ; Frederick H. Wood, (1936) 34 B. T. A. 1252 (loss from
liquidation of trust not deductible) ; Word Specialty Manufacturing Co.,
(1936) 34 B. T. A. 974 (corporation assumed expense of affiliate) ; Otto
Keusch, (1931) 23 B. T. A. 216 (limitation on amount of deductible loss)
Samuel S. Bloch, (1929) 16 B. T. A. 425 (basis for determining loss).276New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, (1934) 292 U. S. 435, 54 Sup.
Ct. 788, 78 L. Ed. 1348, s. c. (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 480 (new
corporation claimed deduction for predecessor's loss) ; Charles Ilfield Co.
v. Hernandez, (1934) 292 U. S. 62, 54 Sup. Ct. 596, 78 L. Ed. 1127(part losses deducted in year suffered); Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose,
(1932) 286 U. S. 319, 52 Sup. Ct. 568, 76 L. Ed. 1128 (deduction for
loss of subsidiary before affiliation denied) ; Burnet v. Thompson Oil &
Gas Co., (1931) 283 U. S. 301, 51 Sup. Ct. 418, 75 L. Ed. 1049 (corpora-
tion claimed an allowance for depletion large enough to restore disallowed
actual depletion of past years) ; Commissioner v. Trustees of Lumber Inv-
Ass'n, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 18 (net loss carry-over);
Lucky Tiger-Combination Gold Mining Co. v. Crooks, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER
related to exemptions, 77 or to deductions relating to capital ex-
penditures rather than ordinary expense 278 --or if it was an ex-
pense, it was incurred in securing tax-exempt income,2t or it was
1938) 95 F. (2d) 885 (deduction for past depletion refused) ; Remco S. S.
Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 988, cert. den,
(1936) 299 U. S. 555, 57 Sup. Ct. 17, 81 L. Ed. 408 (net loss carry-over) ;
Weber Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1936) 82 F.(2d) 764 (loss of old corporation not deductible) ; Van Vleck v. Commis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 217, cert. den. (1936) 298 U. S. 656,
56 Sup. Ct. 676, 80 L. Ed. 1382 (net loss carry-over) ; Planters Cotton Oil
Co. v. Hopkins, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 825, aff'd (1932) 286
U. S. 332, 52 Sup. Ct. 509 (net loss carry-over) ; Kansas City Southern Ry.
v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 372 (past obsolescence) ;
Miller v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 479, 480 (net
loss carry-over).
277-Robert P. Scripps, (1936) 33 B. T. A. 962; Scripps v. Commis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 492 and Bagnall v. Commis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 956, involved the provision per-
mitting the deduction of estate taxes from the income of the estate. Avery
v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 905 and Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1936) 87 F. (2d) 131, revd,
(1937) 301 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 813, 81 L. Ed. 1169, related to the deduc-
tion for charitable contributions; Cooperative Oil Ass'n v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1941) 115 F. (2d) 666, 668, 669 (patronage dividends
not deductible); Chicago & N. W. IL Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th
Cir 1940) 114 F. (2d) 882, 887 (charitable contribution).27sHelvering v. Winmill, (1938) 305 U. S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 45, 83 L.
Ed. 52, (commissions required to be capitalized rather than deducted as ex-
pense); United States v. Sentinel Oil Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 109 F.(2d) 854 (cost of drilling well part of purchase price and must be capital-
ized); Walsh-McGuire Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1938) 97
F. (2d) 983 (capitalize payments of taxes due on land at time of purchase) ;
Bermont Oil Co. v. Helvering, (1937) 67 App. D. C. 256, 91 F. (2d) 710(indemnification expense part of purchase price and must be capitalized);
Crowley v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937). 89 F. (2d) 715 (attor-
ney's fees paid to acquire stock of corporation);- Motion Picture Capital
Corporation v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1936) 80 F. (2d) 872 (or-
ganization, merger and stock listing expenses) ; Baltimore & Ohio . Co. v.
Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 460 (discount on stock
and underwriters' fees); Surety Finance Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
9th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 221 (organization expense and commissions on
sale of stock) ; Barbour Coal Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1934)
74 F. (2d) 163, cert. den. (1935) 295 U. S. 731, 55 Sup. Ct. 643 (com-
missions on sale of preferred stock); Continental Pipe Mfg. Co. v. Poe,(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 694 (expenditures made to protect in-
vestment in bonds must be capitalized); William F. Humphrey, (1935)
33 B. T. A. 442 (expenditures made to protect corporation must be capital-
ized).
.
2t9Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Insurance Co., (1935) 294 U. S.
686, 55 Sup. Ct. 572, 70 L. Ed. 1227 (deduction of amount added to re-
serves limited) ; Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., (1934) 292 U. S.
371, 54 Sup. Ct. 758, 78 L. Ed. 1311 (limitation on deduction for de-
preciation) ; Cleveland Shopping News Co. v. Routzahn, (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 902 (fund paid in by subscribers of advertising
service not taxed when received and may not be deducted when returned to
subscribers); Phipps v. Bowers, (S.D. N.Y. 1930) 46 F. (2d) 164 (in-
terest on loan used to purchase tax-exempt securities not deductible) ; New
World Insurance Co. v. United States, (1939) 89 Ct. Cl. 558, 26 F. Supp.
444, cert. den. (1939) 308 U. S. 612, 60 Sup. Ct. 179, 84 L. Ed. 512 (limita-
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a personal expenditure.28 0 And finally, there are those cases which
dealt with the method of accounting used by the taxpayer, 2 8 the
accounting period in which a deduction should be taken 8 2 and the
tion on deduction for general expense); Waldorf Astor, (1935) 31 B.
T. A. 1009 (deduction of foreign tax limited to income taxed by the
United States).
28ODexter v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 769
(loss on son-in-law's note) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1936) 87 F. (2d) 131, rev'd (1937) 301 U. S. 379,
57 Sup. Ct. 813, 81 L. Ed. 1169 (charitable contribution? ; Avery v. Com-
missioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 905, disapproved, United
States v. Pleasants, (1939) 305 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 281, 83 L. Ed.
217 (charitable contributions); Lindley v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1933) 63 F. (2d) 807 (attorney's fees in action to recover estate tax);
Lloyd v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 842 (attorney's
fees in action for slander) ; Kenan v. Bowers, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 50 F.
(2d) 112 (additional fees paid trustees by beneficiary) ; Ielen H. 1leil-
broner, (1936) 34 B. T. A. 1200 (commission paid for collecting income).
28 United States v. 0. J. Morrison Stores, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938)
99 F. (2d) 77 (failed to supply information required) ; American Can
Co. v. Bowers, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 832 (inventory valua-
tion); Robinson-Davis Lumber Co. v. Crooks, (W.D. Mo. 1931) 50 F.
(2d) 638 (failed to charge off bad debt in year ascertained to be worth-
less); Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, (D. Mass. 1940) 35
F. Supp. 523, 525 (reserve for bad debts).
28 2Du Pont v. Deputy, (1940) 308 U. S. 488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 84 L.
Ed. 416 (expenditure capitalized) ; United States v. Sentinel Oil Co
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 854 (expenditure capitalized) ; United
States v. Donaldson Realty Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 509
(expenditure to be capitalized) ; Burdan v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 3d Cir.
1939) 106 F. (2d) 207 (failed to prove year loss realized) ; Jones v. Com-
missioner, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 681 (failed to prove the
loss was suffered in the year claimed); Walsh-McGuire Co. v. Commlis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 983 (expenditure should have
been capitalized); Helvering v. Obici, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d)
431, aff'd, (1939) 305 U. S. 468, 59 Sup. Ct. 260, 83 L. Ed. 292 (depre-
ciated value of property basis for deductible loss) ; Sabath v. Conimmis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 569 (failed to show year in
which stock became worthless) ; Bermont Oil Co. v. Helvering, (1937) 67
App. D. C. 256, 91 F. (2d) 710 (expenditure should be capitalized) ; Walker
v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 297 (gift incomplete in
year deducted); Crowley v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937) 87 F.
(2d) 715 (expenditure should be capitalized); Merchants Bank Bldg. Co.
v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 478 (expenditure should
have been capitalized); McGinley Corporation v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 56 (failed to show that loss was realized);
Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1936) 81 F.
(2d) 697 (cash discounts deducted only when actually taken) ; Commis-
sioner v. Riggs, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 1004 (failed to show
amount of loss actually realized) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Conmmis-
sioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 456 (taxpayer on accrued bases
must deduct refund in year due rather than year paid) ; Squier v. Coln-
missioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 68 F. (2d) 25 (failed to show year in
which loss occurred); Martin v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 61
F. (2d) 942, cert. den. (1933) 289 U. S. 737, 53 Sup. Ct. 656, 77 L, Ed.
1485 (may not deduct loss in installments) ; Continental Pipe Mfg. Co. v.
Poe, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 694 (debt must be charged off in
year ascertained to be worthless) ; Jankowsky v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
10th Cir. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 1006 (failed to show amount of loss) ; Pugh v.
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regulations for the prevention of avoidance and evasion.1s The
depletion cases may be explained on the ground that the "common
understanding" of the meaning of income does not require the
deduction of an allowance for wasting assets, 2 s' while the case
sustaining the limitation on interest expense may be explained
by the fact that such limitation applied only to corporations and
that the limitation was necessary to prevent the distribution of
dividends under the guise of interest payments and thereby re-
duce the amount of corporate income subject to the tax.2"8 Yet
even if the remarks contained in more than a hundred cases
Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 76, cert. denied, (1931)
284 U. S. 642, 52 Sup. Ct. 22 (failed to show that loss was realized);
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 78 (Workmen's compensation expense deducted only when actually
paid); New Creek Co. v. Lederer, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 295 Fed. 433(prorata deduction of royalty value) ; Pierre S. du Pont, (1938) 37 B. T. A.
1198 (expenditure capitalized) ; Westerfield v. Rafferty, (E.D. N.Y. 1925)
4 F. (2d) 590 (expenditure should have been capitalized); American
Arch Co., (1935) 33 B. T. A. 705 (expenditure should have been deducted
in year made instead of being capitalized); S. E. Thomason, (1935) 33
B. T. A. 576 (taxpayer on cash basis may not deduct accrued interest);
William F. Humphrey, (1935) 33 B. T. A. 442 (expenditure to be capital-
ized rather than deducted as expense); Paul Pryibil, (1934) 31 B. T. A.
164 (failed to show year in which loss occurred).2 30'Laughlin v. Helvering, (1935) 65 App. D. C. 135, 81 F. (2d)
269 (failed to show full details of expenditure alleged to have been made) ;
Commissioner v. Riggs, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 1004 (purchase
and sale to reduce taxes) ; Hecht v. United States, (1932) 74 Ct. Cl. 748,
54 F. (2d) 968 (salary paid son deemed excessive).284See supra note 166. Among the cases falling within this category
are: Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corporation, (1938) 303 U. S.
376; 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. Ed. 907 (amount of discovery value) ; Helver-
ing v. Bankline Oil Co., (1938) 303 U. S. 362, 58 Sup. Ct. 616. 82 L.
Ed. 897 (casing-head gas contracts); Palmer v. Bender, (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1932) 57 F. (2d) 32, rev'd, (1933) 287 U. S. 551, 53 Sup. Ct. 225, 77 L
Ed. 489 (partly entitled to deduct discovery value); Darby-Lynde Co. v.
Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 32 (partly entitled to
deduct discovery value); Jefferson & Clearfield Coal Co. v. United States,
(1936) 83 Ct. Cl. 712, 14 F. Supp. 918 (1913 value less than cost; de-
pletion basis on 1913 value sustained); Hurley v. Davis, (N.D. Okla.
1935) 10 F. Supp. 365 (casing-head gas contracts); Lizzie H. Glide,
(1933) 27 B. T. A. 1264 (bonus payments received on lease not subject to
272%o depletion when wells not yet in operation) ; Phoenix Oil Production
'Co, (1932) 25 B. T. A. 1239 (discovery value eliminated) ; CommodoreMining Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 131, 133(discovery value abandoned); J. E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
9th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 655, 658 (depletion controversy).215 See the suggestion to this effect in connection with the 1909 Act
made by Day, J., in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107. 173,
31 Sup. Ct. 342, 358, 55 L. Ed. 389. An alternative explanation would be
that the sixteenth amendment adopted the 1909 Act's definition of income
and a similar limitation was found in that statute. See Bowers v. Kerbaugh-
Empire Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 170, 174, 46 Sup. Ct. 449, 451, 70 L. Ed. 886(income under the sixteenth amendment said to be same as income under the
1909 Act). Cf. Browvn-Rogers-Dixon Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1941) 122 F. (2d) 347.
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amount to mere dicta, their cumulative force is so great that the
doctrine of the New Colonial Ice Co. Case is not likely to be
seriously questioned in the future. Congress may tax gross in-
come.
286
Shocking as this principle is to the accountant, it unfortu-
nately does not grossly violate the vague and inaccurate defini-
tion of the word "income" as used by laymen in 1913 and, to a
lesser extent, even today.28 7 The man-in-the-street often refers to
his profit as being the difference between cost and selling price
without meticulously estimating his overhead and other expenses.
If his oversight is mentioned to him, he will, of course, instantly
agree that he has overstated his profit, but he will, in the next
breath, repeat his inaccuracy. Accountants themselves have only
recently frowned on the use of "gross income" in financial state-
ments, and its use has by no means disappeared. Therefore, an
income tax statute which attempts to tax gross income will not
so obviously violate the meaning of "incomes" as used in the
sixteenth amendment as to warrant a prediction of unconstitution-
ality under a strict, direct-tax theory of income taxation. Clearly
there is no likelihood of such a prediction if the Court should
recognize the genesis of the doctrine of congressional absolutism
over deductions.
However, this recognition is imperative if Congress should
attempt to tax gross receipts by the means of an income tax. It is
easy enough to imagine circumstances which would require the
raising of tremendous revenues to meet a continued national
emergency; a transactions-income tax is not beyond the realm of
possibility. If Congress should broaden the income tax to include
all receipts, a far more serious question of the power of Congress
over deductions would be raised. There is still a tendency to
think of the income tax exclusively in terms of the Pollock Case
and the sixteenth amendment and to ignore the other taxing
powers of the federal government.
If the Court should return to the doctrine that an income
tax is an excise rather than a direct tax, most of the objections
to a tax on the receipts from both profitable and unprofitable trans-
actions would be removed. Congress may tax property other than
28 Paul and Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation (1934)
and secs. 1.10, 4.22, 7.29, 7.44, 20.01, 21.01, 26.25. Cf. Mertens, 1939 Supple-
ment, sec. 4.22.
28 See Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (1926) 457.
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real estate,2s s and the tax may be assessed more than once upon
such property.28 9 In addition, Congress may tax the sale,210 gift, -'0
and inheritance2 - of both real and personal property and the tax
may be measured by the gross value of the sale, gift, and inheri-
tance. Congress may also tax the gross receipts of a business, and
the tax may be measured by receipts not essential to the conduct of
the enterprise.2 13 The business concept is a flexible one and it could
be easily extended to cover a single transaction such as the ex-
change of assets or the payment of a debt. It would thus seem clear
that Congress could tax gross receipts by a statute framed in the
character of an excise. Furthermore there would appear to be no
insuperable constitutional objection to a graduated excise tax on
gross receipts. Graduated taxes have been levied by Congress" '
2ssCornell v. Coyne, (1904) 192 U. S. 418, 24 Sup. Ct. 383, 48 L. Ed.
504; Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, (1937) 301 U. S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct.
764, 81 L. Ed. 1122; Pennsylvania v. Fix, (M.D. Pa. 1934) 9 F. Supp.
272; Billings v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 58
L. Ed. 596; United States v. Bennett, (1914) 232 U. S. 299, 34 Sup. Ct.
433, 58 L. Ed. 612; cf. United States v. Goelet, (1914) 232 U. S. 293, 34
Sup. Ct. 431; 58 L. Ed. 610; Pierce v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 90,
34 Sup. Ct. 427, 58 L. Ed. 609. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co, (1895) 9 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 210. For a tax of one-twenty-fourth of
one per cent each month on average deposits "with any person, bank, associa-
tion, company or corporation, engaged in the business of banking" see
(1864) 13 Stat. at L. 277.28 Patton v. Brady, (1902) 184 U. S. 608, 22 Sup. Ct. 493, 46 L. Ed. 713.
29ONicol v. Ames, (1899) 173 U. S. 509, 19 Sup. Ct. 522, 43 L. Ed.
786; Thomas v. United States, (1904) 192 U. S. 363. 24 Sup. Ct. 305. 48
L. Ed. 481; Alexander Theatre Ticket Office v. United States, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 44; United Cigar Stores Co. of America v. United
States, (1931) 74 Ct Cl. 744, 50 F. (2d) 466.
291Bromley v. McCaughn, (1929) 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46, 74
L. Ed. 226.
29-Knowlton v. Moore, (1900) 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed.
969; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, (1921) 256 U. S. 345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506,
65 L. Ed. 963.
293Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, (1904) 192 U. S. 397,
24 Sup. Ct. 376, 48 L. Ed. 496; Standard Oil Co. v. McLaughlin, (C.C.A.
9th Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 111.
294A graduated tax on household furniture was enacted as early as
1816. 3 Stat- at L. 186. A progressively graduated excise tax was sus-
tained in Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, (1925) 269 U. S. 269, 46
Sup. Ct. 110, 70 L. Ed. 270, a case involving the fifth amendment. How-
ever, in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, (1936) 294 U. S. 550. 55 Sup.
Ct. 525, 79 L. Ed. 1054, a graduated state sales tax was said to be "un-
justifiably unequal, whimsical and arbitrary" and therefore violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. There was a strong dis-
senting opinion by Cardozo, J., joined in by Brandeis and Stone, JJ. Cf.
Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, (1908) 9 Am.
Econ. Ass'n Q. 1, 101. "In the United States the progressive principle has
been applied in no less than six classes of imposts, namely, the house tax,
the income tax, the business tax, the corporation tax, the inheritance tax,
and the land tax" A gross receipts tax on exports would present a different
question. See Note (1916) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 79.
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and have been sustained in spite of the objection of the taxpayer
and the occasional dissent of a member of the Supreme Court. 99
If a graduated tax may be sustained when in the form of an
ordinary excise, it is difficult to believe that it would not be sus-
tained today even though in the form of an income tax ;210 and
such is the necessary effect of a number of Supreme Court de-
cisions."'
The pseudo-economic 2 8 interpretation of direct taxes found in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. was immediately aban-
doned."' 9 To avoid the unpleasant task of overruling that unfor-
tunate decision the Court, in effect, accepted the doctrine that
the difference between a direct tax and an indirect tax was merely
the difference between a statute which used a direct method of
describing a tax and one which used an indirect method of de-
scribing the same tax.
That part of the Pollock decision which denied Congress the
power to tax income has been overruled by the sixteenth amend-
ment ;300 that part of the decision which extended the definition of
a direct tax to include a tax on personal property has never been
successfully invoked to strike down an excise tax and the only
time that it has been used to strike down an income tax involved
a case where Congress attempted to tax the shareholder on the
295E. g., see supra, p. 440.
296A combination of the "income" and "excise" tax should present no
constitutional difficulty. In sustaining a federal "income" tax on the profit
from the sale of municipal bonds, the Court, in Willcutts v. Bun, (1931)
282 U. S. 216, 227, 51 Sup. Ct. 127, 75 L. Ed. 304, said that "the tax upon
profits . . . [from a sale] is an excise. . . . The federal income tax acts
cover taxes of different sorts." For a reference to the combined tax see
Morrissey v. Commissioner, (1935) 296 U. S. 344, 355, 56 Sup. Ct. 289, 294,
80 L. Ed. 263.
29 7See supra, pp. 461-465.
2 9 5See Seligman, Income Tax (1914) 538, 579, 580, 581.
2 9 9 See supra, Part IV.
30OThe widespread belief that Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
would have been overruled without the aid of the sixteenth amendment has
been greatly strengthened by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.
In New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, (1937) 300 U. S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 466,
81 L. Ed. 666, the view that an income tax was one on the property and
leviable only by the state in which the land was located, was rejected. And
in Graves v. O'Keefe, (1939) 306 U. S. 466, 480, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 598, 83
L. Ed. 927, it was said that "The theory, which once won a qualified ap-
proval, that a tax on income is legally and economically a tax on its
source, is no longer tenable. . . ." See Hale v. Iowa Board of Assessment,
and Review, (1937) 302 U. S. 95, 58 Sup. Ct. 102, 82 L. Ed. 72. See also,
Evans, A Constitutional Problem in Federal Income Taxation (1935) 7
Rocky Mount. L. Rev. 85, 98, 99. Cf. State ex rel. Botkin v. Welsh, (S.D.
1933) 251 N. W. 189; (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 780.
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"undistributed" profits of a corporation 3°--and even this one
case was effectively sterilized by subsequent opinions.302
But even if the Pollock and Macomber Cases are not to be
expressly overruled, it may be said that for all practical purposes
the Supreme Court has returned to the doctrine which had been
followed for more than a century, viz., capitation taxes and taxes
on real estate must be apportioned; all other taxes must be uni-
form. In substance the Hylton Case delimits the federal taxing
power.
At most the Pollock Case requires nothing more than the
use of artificial and somewhat ludicrous distinctions.30 3 The
Court has dearly indicated the method which may be used to
lay and collect taxes on gross receipts. If the Court should insist
that the income tax be used only to tax income or that which
vaguely resembles income and thus refuse to make a clean break
with the "strange case of Pollock v. Faners' Loan & Tnst
Co.," 34 a proper observance of the "prescribed rituals" will en-
able Congress to obtain the result it deems necessary or desirable.
But instead of requiring needless experiments in legislative drafts-
manship, it is more probable that the Court will return to its
concept of the income tax which antedated the Pollock Case and
immediately preceded Eisner v. Macomber.
3 0
'Eisner v. Macomber, (1913) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L.
Ed. 521.
-
30 2See supra, pp. 466-467, and notes 252, 254-256.
303E. g., Congress is not taxing property or income, but is taxing a
privilege (which it doesn't grant) measured by property or income.
304(1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759; (1895) 158
U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108. Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of
the Constitutional Law of Taxation (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 628, 646.
